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Kirk Juillard Gosch, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Kirk Juillard Gosch, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

7/2712007

NCPC

JANUSCH

New Case Filed - Post Conviction Relief

JANUSCH

Filing: 9SPC - Post Conviction Relief Filing Paid To Be Assigned
by: state Receipt number: 0755153 Dated:
7/30/2007 Amount: $.00 (Cash) For: [NONE]

PETN

JANUSCH

Petition & Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief

To Be Assigned

AFFD

JANUSCH

Affidavit of Kirk Gosch

To Be Assigned

MOTN

JANUSCH

Motion & Affidavit for Fee Waiver

To Be Assigned

7/30/2007

ADMR

JANUSCH

Administrative assignment of Judge

Charles W. Hosack

8/1/2007

ANSW

MCCOY

Respondent's Answer to Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief

Charles W. Hosack

8/9/2007

MISC

MCCORD

petitioner's response to respondent's answer to
petition for post-conviction relief

Charles W. Hosack

8/16/2007

ORDR

RICKARD

Order For Waiver Of Prepaid Fees (Prisoner)

Charles W. Hosack

ORDR

RICKARD

Order Granting Motion For Appointment Of
Counsel

Charles W. Hosack

8/24/2007

SUBC

BOWLES

Substitution Of Counsel

Charles W. Hosack

2/20/2008

NOPD

DUBE

Notice Of Proposed Dismissal Issued

Charles W. Hosack

3/11/2008

10PR

MEYER

Inactivity Order Printed - File Sent to Judge

Charles W. Hosack

AFFD

LSMITH

Affidavit in support of retention

Charles W. Hosack

AFFD

LSMITH

Affidavit in support of Amended Petition for Post
Conviction Relief

Charles W. Hosack

MOTN

LSMITH

Motion to permit plaintiff to file an Amended Post Charles W. Hosack
Conviction Relief Petition

ORDR

LSMITH

Order of retention

Charles W. Hosack

3/17/2008

HRSC

ROHRBACH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Amend
04/15/2008 03:00 PM) Petition/Payne/15 min

Charles W. Hosack

3/21/2008

NOHG

LSMITH

Notice Of Hearing

Charles W. Hosack

4/14/2008

HRVC

ROHRBACH

Hearing result for Motion to Amend held on
04/15/2008 03:00 PM: Hearing Vacated
Petition/Payne/15 min

Charles W. Hosack

4/21/2008

STIP

ROHRBACH

Stipulation to Permit Plaintiff to File Amended
Petition as Proposed & Vacate 4-15-08 hrg

Charles W. Hosack

5/1/2008

STIP

PARKER

Stipulation to Permit Plaintiff to File Amended
Petition as Proposed and to Vacate Motion Set
for 4/15/08 at 3:00P M

Charles W. Hosack

8/18/2008

PETN

MCCOY

AMENDED Petition for Post Conviction Relief

Charles W. Hosack

AFFD

MCCOY

Affidavit in Support of Amended Petition for Post Charles W. Hosack
Conviction Relief

9/23/2008

ANSW

LSMITH

Amended Answer

Charles W. Hosack

11/19/2008

HRSC

ROHRBACH

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
02/17/200903:00 PM) Payne

Charles W. Hosack

11/24/2008

NOHG

ROBINSON

Noti.ce Of Hearing

Charles W. Hosack

Judge
To Be Assigned
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Kirk Juillard Gosch, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Kirk Juillard Gosch, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

12/2/2008

MISC

HUFFMAN

2/17/2009

INHD

ROHRBACH

Judge
Substitution of Counsel - Jed K Nixon for Linda J Charles W. Hosack
Payne Conflict PO
Hearing result for Status Conference held on

Charles W. Hosack

02/17/200903:00 PM: Interim Hearing Held

Payne
DCHH

ROHRBACH

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: JoAnn Schaller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

Charles W. Hosack

NOTE

ROHRBACH

Tickle for 30 days

Charles W. Hosack

3/13/2009

BRIE

BAXLEY

Brief In Support of State's Motion For Summary
Disposition

Charles W. Hosack

6/16/2009

HRSC

ROHRBACH

Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Dismiss
07/16/200903:00 PM) Verharen - 15 min

Charles W. Hosack

6/17/2009

NOHG

SREED

Notice Of Hearing

Charles W. Hosack

6/19/2009

MOTN

CRUMPACKER Respondents Motion for Summary Disposition

Charles W. Hosack

7/15/2009

OBJT

LEU

Objection To Motion For Summary Disposition

Charles W. Hosack

7/16/2009

HRHD

ROHRBACH

Charles W. Hosack
Hearing result for Motion to Dismiss held on
07/16/200903:00 PM: Hearing Held Verharen15 min

DCHH

ROHRBACH

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: JoAnn Schaller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated:

Charles W. Hosack

7/17/2009

ORDR

ROHRBACH

Order - 60 days to file Amended Petition

Charles W. Hosack

9/15/2009

AFFD

COCHRAN

Affidavit in Support of Amended Petition for Post Charles W. Hosack
Conviction Relief

PETN

RICKARD

Amended Petition For Post Conviction Relief

ADMR

MEYER

Administrative assignment of Judge (batch
process)

SREED

Notice of Reassignment of Case to Correct
Jurisdiction and Judge

Benjamin R. Simpson

LARSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
06/23/201003:00 PM)

Benjamin R. Simpson

LARSEN

Notice of Hearing

Benjamin R. Simpson

1/5/2010
1/6/2010
4/22/2010

6/23/2010

7/12/2010

HRSC

Charles W. Hosack

HRHD

LARSEN

Hearing result for Status Conference held on
06/23/2010 03:00 PM: Hearing Held

Benjamin R. Simpson

DCHH

LARSEN

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: JoAnn Schaller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100 pages

Benjamin R. Simpson

MEMO

LARSEN

2nd Amended Memorandum Opinion On
Respondent's Motion For Summary Disposition

Benjamin R. Simpson

AFFD

CRUMPACKER Affidavit of Kirk Gosch

PETN

LARSEN

Amended Petition For Post Conviction Relief

Benjamin R. Simpson
Benjamin R. Simpson
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Kirk Juillard Gosch, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Kirk Juillard Gosch, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

8/9/2010

HRSC

LARSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled
02/28/2011 09:00 AM) half day trial

Benjamin R. Simpson

LARSEN

Notice of Trial

Benjamin R. Simpson

PTOR

LARSEN

Uniform Pretrial Order

Benjamin R. Simpson

MNCN

LARSEN

Motion To Continue Trial

Benjamin R. Simpson

ORCT

LARSEN

Order To Continue Trial

Benjamin R. Simpson

CONT

LARSEN

Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled held on
02/28/2011 09:00 AM: Continued half day trial

Benjamin R. Simpson

HRSC

LARSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Pre-Trial Conference
04/21/2011 08:00 AM)

Benjamin R. Simpson

HRSC

LARSEN

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial Scheduled
04/26/2011 09:00 AM) half day trial

Benjamin R. Simpson

2/2812011

SUBC

BIELEC

Substitution Of Counsel

Benjamin R. Simpson

3/1/2011

NOTC

LARSEN

Trial Notice

Benjamin R. Simpson

NOHG

LARSEN

Notice Of Pre-Trial Conference And Trial

Benjamin R. Simpson

4/19/2011

MOTN

CRUMPACKER Motion for Telephonic Appearance

4/21/2011

HRHD

LARSEN

Hearing result for Pre-Trial Conference held on
04/21/2011 08:00 AM: Hearing Held

Benjamin R. Simpson

DCHH

LARSEN

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: JoAnn Schaller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100 pages

Benjamin R. Simpson

PTCO

CRUMPACKER Pre-Trial Compliance

Benjamin R. Simpson

ORDR

LARSEN

Order Denying Motion To Compel Counsel To
Speak

Benjamin R. Simpson

MISC

BAXLEY

Respondent's Witness List

Benjamin R. Simpson

MOTN

BAXLEY

Motion To Take Judicial Notice

Benjamin R. Simpson

BRIE

CLEVELAND

Respondent's Trial Brief

Benjamin R. Simpson

MISC

LARSEN

Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of
Law

Benjamin R. Simpson

LARSEN

Amended Notice of Trial

Benjamin R. Simpson

LARSEN

2nd Amended Notice of Trial

Benjamin R. Simpson

CTST

LARSEN

Hearing result for Court Trial Scheduled held on
05/03/2011 09:00 AM: Court Trial Started half
day trial

Benjamin R. Simpson

DCHH

LARSEN

District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: JoAnn Schaller
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: under 100 pages

Benjamin R. Simpson

FACT

LARSEN

Findings Of Fact, Conclusions Of Law And Order Benjamin R. Simpson

JDMT

LARSEN

Judgment Of Dismissal

2/2512011

4/2212011

4/26/2011

5/312011

5/6/2011

Judge

Benjamin R. Simpson

Benjamin R. Simpson
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Kirk Juillard Gosch, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Kirk Juillard Gosch, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

Judge

5/6/2011

CVDI

LARSEN

Civil Disposition entered for: State of Idaho Post
Conviction Relief, Other Party; Gosch, Kirk
Juillard, Subject. Filing date: 5/6/2011

Benjamin R. Simpson

FJDE

LARSEN

Final Judgement, Order Or Decree Entered

Benjamin R. Simpson

STAT

LARSEN

Case status changed: Closed

Benjamin R. Simpson

MOTN

LARSEN

Motion For Appointment Of State Public Defender Benjamin R. Simpson
In Direct Appeal; Retaining Trial Counsel For
Residual Purposes

NOTC

LARSEN

Notice Of Appeal

5/10/2011

ORPD

LARSEN

Order For Appointment Of State Public Defender Benjamin R. Simpson
In Direct Appeal; Retaining Trial Counsel For
Residual Purposes

5/16/2011

NOTC

LARSEN

Idaho Supreme Court Notice Of Appeal Filed

Benjamin R. Simpson

Benjamin R. Simpson

STATE OF IDAHO
L
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI{SS

FILED:
InmateName K\RK u. GO:::SCH
moc No. to3lo 03 5(( i
Address p c\ eo)': 8C)(~A

-

\rn E..1-1 i'5

CLV

~n07 .JilL 27 Mi 10: 20

EOtSS tOA\=-IC? rolC,?
Petitioner

F l R.5"T

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIlE

. JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAH6, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

KOO\E~(:\ \

8u 0
K\RK. d, C';O;:CH
Petitioner,
vs.

TtlES'TBlE Of \\)8HO
Respondent.

(

'";z.

5-yy3
06-

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. C

RF - 40")

PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT
FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF

The Petitioner alleges:
l.

Place of detention if in custody: ~OU:rH \\:28\=\0 5"T~TF CoR8.ECI-\ONRL

\tJS\\-rU,\,ON
Name and location of the Court which imposed jUdgement/sentence:

3.

The case number and the offense or offenses for which sentence was imposed:

4.

(
'..

F \\3,..S)"

2.

(a)

Case Number: C.R "'05- Y03

(b)

Offense Convicted: 'DAHO COI:>E.. 37-2'J32,(a) ,tee)

The date upon which sentence was imposed and the terms of ~entence:
a.

Date of Sentence: --.:...O.t-A...L.!.;\',-,~u.a..;,.;(o~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~---,-

b.

Terms of Sentence: ,[:..JoG!) £\)(£1) 3HRE.E..(3) \NOE..'IE:.RMtNAl\:::.
t
RE.5~E..~\NE.\...L\ eN ALL C:OUN~

PETITION FOR-POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 1
Revised: 10/13/05

r

5.

(

Check whether a fmding of guilty was made after a plea:
[ ] Of guilty

6.

.fX1 Of not guilty

Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction or the imposition of sentence?
[]Yes ~No
If so, what was the Docket Number of the Appeal?_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

7.

State concisely all the grounds on which you base your application for post
conviction relief: (Use additional sheets ifnecessary.)

cO

UJiTHoCd)"N5

-d) Du E

PrcDC-t;:.5S

0+ EXc.ulpaTo@.if

£i/jsJ..g;nc£

ll/D I aT/ON S

(
8.

Prior to thls petition, have you filed with respect to this conviction:
.a

Petitions in State or Federal Court for habeas corpus?---lNL..3UoOoL-.._ _ _ __
Any other petitions, motions, or applications in any other court?

c.

If you answered yes to a or b above, state the name and court in which each
petition, motion or application was filed:

(

f.-.b

b.

PETITION FORPOST CONVICTION RELIEF - 2
Revised: 10/13/05

C02

9.

If your application is based upon the failure of counsel to adequately represent you,
state concisely and in detail what counsel failed to do in representing your interests:

\\ r:= Pte Ts ..L. N

~ u pljoa;T. "

~)-----------------------------------------(c)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

10.

Are you seeking leave to proceed infOIma pauperis, that is, requesting the
proceeding be at county expense? (If your answer is "yes", you must fill out a
Motion to Proceed-in Fonna Pauperis and supporting affidavit.)

c.

/)(J
11.

Yes

[ ]No

Are you requesting the appointment of counsel to represent you in this case? (If your

answer is "yes", you must fill out a Motion for the Appointment of Counsel and supporting .
affidavit, as well as a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and supporting affidavit.)

[)(J Yes
12.

[ ]No

State specifically the relief you seek:

SEE. AT-rAcHFccl

.....-.-=---...........-,

'-I

PRAYI::..K

PETITION FOR POST C_ONVICTlON RELIEF - 3
Revised: J 0/13/05

[,'"'3

//

13.

This Petition may be accompanied by affidavits in support of the petition. (Forms
for this are available.)

DAJED this

Jl day of _ _1""-'u....,\'Ul~_ _ _---', 20-'L1-.

Petiti((er
STATE OF IDAHO

)
) ss

County of

ADA

KJ R.l( tJ!

)
oesCH

,being sworn, deposes and says that the party is the

Petitioner in the above-entitled appeal and that all statements in this PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF are true and correct to the best ofbis or her knowledge and belief.

c

Petitioner/
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN and AFFIRMED to before me this

~Iy

(SEAL)

,2007

Notary Public
dabo·
Commission expires:

PETITION FOR-POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 4
Revised: 10/13/05

17, day of

~

~
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'STATE OF IDAHO

}

cOU~ny OF KOOTnlAI 55

FILED:

WILLIAM 1. DOUGLAS
Prosecuting Attorney
Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1971
Telephone: (208) 446-1800

2007 AUG -I PM 4: 24

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
KIRK J. GOSCH,
Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 07-5443
RESPONDENT'S ANSWER
TO PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

-------------------------)
Respondent, State of Idaho, through the office of the Kootenai County Prosecuting
Attorney, responds to the allegations contained in the Petition for Post-conviction Relief filed by the
Petitioner and states as follows:
I

Respondent denies all allegations not specifically admitted herein.
II

Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 1-6 of the Petition for Postconviction Relief

Respondent denies the allegations in paragraphs 7 and 9.

Respondent has

insufficient knowledge of the facts alleged in paragraph 8 and therefore denies the same.

RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO PETITION
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 1

015

Paragraphs 10-13 of the Petition for Post-conviction Relief are not allegations requiring an answer
by Respondent.
AffIrmative Defense

Petitioner's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Therefore, Respondent respectfully requests that the Petition for Post-conviction Relief be
dismissed and that the Petitioner be granted no post-conviction relief.

"3 /

:5c I'-Y
A

DATED this ~ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _, 2007

~l\ VIN\ (~>14'AR
VERHAREN
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

$1

I hereby certify that on the
day of ;]Z1\(_i/
,2007, a true and correct copy
o f the foregoing was caused to be sent to Kirk Gosch, IDOe No. 63663, POB 8509, Boise, ID
83707

RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO PETITION
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1day of

R -----,

A lA.§lD.s+
D.

1

mailed a true and correct copy of£~ ( (I ol\k,~->

20~,I

rc:-£_spoclf~-AiijilffiAVi'Fvia

,

the U.S.

mail system to:

kOO\I~NA;

COUI'J7=a-

p.O. 80x

qoOf)

pVLDs~ed7/:\l1 A -rrDIZ-l,,-e~_

Signature

-pg.

3
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S'tAF '.:! I['"11\1';('
.,j

COU('1'\'
FIl.£::

Inmate name KtR.K \ t GcS~i-\
IDOCNo. Co::>C,a,3 StC( - 0"\St.{S
Address ~'X Fi'E3C?9
\30(.":£ 10 83')0')

}ss

Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE ---lY:-'--(!..L:R:~SoL0...l..--_ __
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

C vO:t-)lfLt~
Case No. G~F 4-03

)
)
)
)

Petitioner,

)

vs.

ORDER FOR W AlVER
OF PREPAID FEES
(pRISONER)

.

)
)
)
)

STAlE. DE \)DfH.:\O

Respondent.

\(~b.H~\

--------------------------~)
Having reviewed the

(

r;IJ Petitioner's

[ ] Respondent's Motion and Affidavit for Fee

Waiver,

k

THIS COURT ORDERS a p~ial fee of$

D

must be paid.

[ ] THIS COURT DENIES the waiver because the Court fmds the applicant is not an indigent
prisoner pursuant to Idaho Code § 31-3220A.

DATED thistLday of

<}.tt .

.,2&/·

. .Gu...lc jQ .{..

DIstrIct
I certifY that a copy was served:
16 f..j( Gosc \-\ .
[ ] Hand-delivery
Name:
Address:
l.o '6 (PIP ~ OS 1c.1 - MeNS eW( rxI Mailing
[] Facsimil
City, State, Zip: BoISE. , \ D ~~1v1-

--.

_....!-A..:...:...U._bvt:_S-'-I_I'-"-~-+1UJD1Date

Revised 10113/05

020

SlATf ::: I[WiCl
COUi'Ji\ ~\: . "

1

ISS

FIl.E~:

Inmate name KfR.fC ,I, GoscH
IDOC No. tcoCcla3 5tc:..l '...:.. £l1 E- N 15 C LV L
Address . \?Q)( 850.,
?o1~E. UD. R3102

IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF TIIE_-,-f..L!IR5~;-r-,--_ _ _ JUDICIAL DISTRlCT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

vs.
S:IAJ:E-,. OE t08\:\0

Respondent.

(

CtJOt"stlL{?;'
Case No. -e: Rr - yo 3

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,

Kcx::crF t--.U-\ \

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR
APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL

IT IS HEARBY ORDERED that the' Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of
Counsel is granted and

kr1:4v; ~ tfuIJ/,c.. (k£AC/~(attorney's

name), a dilly

licensed attorney in the State of Idaho, is hereby appointed to represent said defendant in
all proceedings involving the post conviction petition.
DATED this

4'

day of

c/lc;JW

,2a&/

~.
District Judge

.~ C; 1~c;J,;t::) - Z"Z) - E,.,+: ...e

.(1,' Ie.

(C;c..fb ~ ~CZ> .. ~,,--r:1'€. ..fL;Je..

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL
Revised 10/13/05

(?_;?£)~

~c.--~

f)'
O, L.I

STATE O~ I[II\HO
}
COUNT':' OF I<OCiTENP.I

Linda J. Payne
Attorney at Law
Contrael Public Delcnder
1034 N. Third Slreel, Suite 9
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 831{ J 4
(208) 665-1303: 255-7555
(208) 6()7-8292 FAX
ISH #6222

~ FIL1~~

~r.JIG

18 ANIO: 57

Attorney for PJ.I'1.in\:,jrf

IN THE DlS'fRICf COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICr OF '1'1-1L: STATE
OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOCYfENAI
KiRK JUILLARD GOSCH.
Plaintiff,

CASE': NO. CV-2007-5443

Defendant,

AMENDED PETITION
FCm POST CONVICTION
RELIEF

vs,

STATE OF IDAHO,
)

COMES NOW, plaintiff: and hereby amends his Petition for Posl

C~oHvicLion

Relief as follows:

I,

Petitioner is not in custody_

2,

The Courl which imposed the sentence is the First Judicial District
State of Idaho, In and For the County

3.

'I'he case

nU.IIlber

or the

or Kootenai.

is C.I{-2005-403. 'fhe

senLenc~

\vas ill1J)Oscd Cor £1

conviction of MUlluhlcluring a Cuntrolled Substance (Marijuana), a
violation of Idaho Code 37-2732(a), Possession of Marijuana with Intenl
to Deliver. a violation of klaho Code 37-2732(a). and Possession

AMENDED PETITION FOR PCR- Page

J

02:2

0('

S8

Marijuana in Excess of Three OUllces, a violation of Idaho Code 372732(e).
4.

The sentence was imposed 01~ SLptembcr 20, 2006, probation violation
disposition OClober J S, 2()06. The sentence was Ivvo detcrrninale plus

three indeferminate for ::1 lolnl unified sentence of:) years. l'he sentence
was the same on each count run cOJl(.;urrenLly.
5.

A Jinding of guilty was made after a plea of' not guilty,

6.

No appeal hom the judgment of conviction was made.

7.

The grounds upon which tbis:pplication for pust conviction relief are
based follow:
ineffective Assistance

or 'rrial Counsel in violalion of the Sixth

Amendment.
8.

Prior to this petition, petitioner has filed no state or federal habeas corpus
petitions. Prior

(0

this petition, petitioner has [iled no other petitions,

motions or applications in any other court.
WHEREFORE, pJaintiffprays as 1()llows:

l.

That the (:ourt rind thaI defendunt's cOLillsel vvas ineffective and in

violation of his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by errol1cow;ly
advising Mr. Gosch that if he appealed, he could he retried on the
trafficking in cocaine not guilty jury verdict, and that such advise caused

Mr. C,osch to rcfl-ain from iiling an appeal. and thal he was prejudiced
thereby.

AMENDED PETITION FOR peR .... Page 2
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2.

'fhat the Co urI grant Mr. Gosch 42 days from the enlry of its Order on this
post conviction malleI" 10 file an appeal.

3.

For other and further relief as the court deems just and equitable,

J)A'n~D this

. .....3~_ day of Marcil,

200~L

STArE OF IDAHO
: ss
County of Kootenai

I, KIRK JUILLARD GOSCH, being firsl duJy sworn upon oath. c.kpose and say,
that J am the pJaintiJfherein, ancl all stalellJ.enls made in the l(lfcgoing Amended Petition
for Post Convi.ctionRdief arc truc and currect to the best of my kllovvledge and bel icC

(/~..,.--"'--

-

... ..,-")

" / / ' /.,,,//

(/

.//.,.

idRl~ilDt~D~OsCH=-="""~- --

AMENDED .PE'rITIONFOR peR .... Page J

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICCE

lhcJ.~'

I herehy certify lhal on
day or August, 20CHL I caused a true and correct copy of
the /()regoing documenllo be served upon the It)llowing person in the j()lJowing manner:
J( OOlenai

I
I

County Prosecuting Attorney

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Mail
] I· land delivered
Facsimile No.
I (\)Urthollse Mail
I Other: _________.___

:p..:p

/' I
t

S',AF Of IDAHO

>ss

COUNTY OF KOOTENAIJ
FILED:

WILLIAM J. DOUGLAS
Prosecuting Attorney
501 Govt Way/Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1971
Telephone: (208) 446-1800

2008 SEP 23 AM to: 35

ASSIGNED ATTORNEY:
BLAKE SWENSON

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
KIRK JUILLARD GOSCH,
Petitioner,

vs.

)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2007-5443
AMENDED ANSWER

)

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
)
Respondent. )
)

RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, through the office of the Kootenai County
Prosecuting Attorney, Blake G Swenson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, responds to the allegations
contained in the above referenced Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by the Petitioner and
states as follows:
I

Respondent denies all allegations not specifically admitted herein.
II

Respondent admits the allegations contained in paragraph(s) 1-5, of the Petition for PostConviction Relief.

026

III

Respondent has no knowledge by which to admit or deny the allegation contained in
paragraph(s) 6-8 of the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and therefore denies the same.
IV
DEFENSES
First AffIrmative Defense

The Petition for Post-Conviction Relief fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
Second AffIrmative Defense

The Petition for Post-Conviction Relief fails to allege sufficient facts that would vest
jurisdiction in this Court.
Respondent, having fully answered all allegations contained in the Petition for PostConviction Relief filed herein, Respondent hereby respectfully prays as follows:
1.) that this matter be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction;
2.) that this matter be dismissed for failure to state a claim;
3.) that this matter be dismissed on its merits;
4.) that petitioner take nothing by way of the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
5.) that this Honorable Court take judicial notice of the underlying criminal case.
5.) for such further relief as the Court deems just.

II/
/11
RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF.

2

DATED this

.22--

dayof

k-/

,2008.
WILLIAM J. DOUGLAS
Prosecuting Attorney for
Kootenai County, Idaho

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

,

I hereby certify that on the ~ day of S~
2008, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing was caused to be mailed, faxed, or sent interoffice mail to:
Lind Payne, Conflict Public Defender, 1034 N. Third Street, Suite 9, CDA, ID 83814.
Fax: (208) 667-8292

RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO PETITION AND AFFIDAVIT
FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF.
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BARRY MCHUGH
Prosecuting Attorney
501 N. Government Way/P.O. BOX 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone: (208) 446-1800
Assigned Attorney:

TERRI LAIRD
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
KIRK J. GOSCH,

)

) CASE NO. CV-07-5443
)
) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY
) DISPOSITION

Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
)

COMES NOW TERRI LAIRD, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County,
Idaho, the "Respondent" in the above-titled matter, and hereby submits a brief in support of the
State's "Motion for Summary Disposition" filed concurrently herewith.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In Kootenai County case #F05-403, the Petitioner (hereinafter referred to as "Gosch")
was convicted by a jury of Manufacturing a Controlled Substance (Marijuana), Possession of
Marijuana with the Intent to Deliver and Possession of Marijuana in Excess of Three Ounces.
Sentencing was held on September 20t\ 2006. Gosch was sentenced to a five (5) year
prison sentence, with two (2) years fixed plus three (3) years indetenninate.
Petitioner never filed an appeal (as he concedes on page 2 of his "Petition and Affidavit
for Post-Conviction Relief," hereinafter referred to as his "petition"). Petitioner first filed a
Petition for Post Conviction Relief on or about July 27, 2007. The State filed her Answer on or

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION - 1
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about July 31, 2007. Petitioner filed an Amended Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction
Relief on or about March 3, 2008. The State filed an Amended Answer on or about September
22, 2008, and the State now moves for summary disposition in its favor.
ISSUE
Has Gosch failed to state a genuine issue of material fact in his petition?

ARGUMENT

Gosch has failed to state a genuine issue of material fact.
Gosch in his Petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in paragraph 7, essentially
making an argument that his counsel advised him not to appeal his conviction. Gosch elaborates
on this argument in the affidavit attached to his amended petition, but he makes just the one basic
argument. As to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Gosch has failed to state a genuine
issue of material fact, and the State is entitled to summary disposition of this argument as a
matter of law.
Summary dismissal upon a motion to dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief is
permissible where the evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Gonzalez v. State, 120 Idaho
759,763,819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct.App. 1991). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine
issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279,
1280 (Ct.App. 1986).
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil proceeding and
the petitioner bears the burden of establishing that he is entitled to relief. State v. Bearshield, 104
Idaho 676,678,662 P.2d 548,550 (1983); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,315,900 P.2d 221,
223 (Ct.App. 1995). However, a petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an
ordinary civil action. A petition must contain more than "a short and plain statement of the
claim" that would suffice for a complaint. Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488,
491 (Ct.App. 1995), referencing LR.C.P. 8. The court is not required to accept either the
applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTJON FOR SUMMARY DlSPOSJTION - 2
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conclusions of law. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001); Roman v.
State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App. 1994). A claim for post-conviction relief
is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to I.e. section 19-4906 if the applicant "has not
presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the claims upon
which the applicant bears the burden of proof." Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 960 P.2d 738, 739
(1998); Roman, at 647, and at P.2d 901.
An applicant for post-conviction relief due to ineffective assistance of counsel must meet

a two-pronged test. First, he must show that the attorney's representation did not meet objective
standards of competence, i.e. that counsel's conduct did not fall "within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) and
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). Second, the applicant must
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by his attorney's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 691-96 and Aragon, 114 Idaho 760-61, 760 P.2d at 1176-77. To withstand a motion for
summary disposition of an ineffective assistance claim, the petitioner must allege facts meeting
both these prongs: Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992) and Roman v. State,
125 Idaho 644, 649, 873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct.Ap. 1994).
To establish the deficient performance prong of Strickland, a petitioner must demonstrate
that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Gibson v.
State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986). "Because of the distorting effects of
hindsight in reconstructing the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, there is a strong
presumption that counsel's performance was within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance - that is, 'sound trial strategy.'" Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243,
1248 (Ct.App. 1989), quoting Strickland at 689. Strategic or tactical decisions made by trial
counsel will not be second-guessed on review, unless those decisions are made upon a basis of
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective
evaluation. State v. Roles, 122 Idaho 138,145,832 P.2d 311,318 (Ct.App. 1992); Davis v. State,
116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct.App. 1989). "The constitutional requirement for
ineffective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a defendant who can dredge up a
long series of examples of how the case might have been tried better." Ivey, 123 Idaho 77, 80,
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION - 3

844 P.2d 706, 709 (1992).
To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.
Aragon, at 761 and at 1177; Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct.App.
1999); Roman, at 649 and at 903. That is, a petitioner must show that his attorney's performance
"so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied
upon as having produced ajust result." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686. Satisfaction of the prejudice
element requires a showing that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would not have pled
guilty but would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-29 (1985).
Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out a prima facie
case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman, 125 Idaho at 649,873 P.2d at 903.
As to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Gosch has failed to even adequately
allege that counsel failed the Strickland test. Certainly Gosch has failed to produce admissible
evidence that either prong of the Strickland test - deficient performance and resulting prejUdice can be proven here. The only evidence that Gosch provides is his own affidavit-his own selfserving, subjective statements. Gosch fails to provide any objective evidence to satisfy either
prong of the Strickland test. Therefore, there is no genuine issue of material fact presented in his
petition, and the State is entitled to summary disposition as a matter of law.
Nowhere in his petition, or in the affidavit attached thereto, does Gosch even begin to
properly allege that his attorney's performance was deficient and/or that prejUdice resulted. He
simply offers bald assertions and speculation that his attorney gave certain advice upon which he
chose to rely. Petitioner provides no objective evidence that his attorneys' advice was deficient.
There is no analysis whatsoever of why the alleged failing would be an objective instance of
deficient performance, nor is there any analysis offered as to why counsels' alleged failing
resulted in fundamental prejUdice to Gosch.
For instance, while Gosch's sole claim is that his attorney was deficient in advising him
to not appeal his conviction, Gosch offers no analysis whatsoever of what specifically he would
have appealed, what would be the likely result of an appeal, or how an appeal would have likely
affected his case. There is nothing submitted to instruct the court as to how the suggested failure
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTJON FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITJON - 4

of counsel would have been deficient by an objective standard, or how he was prejudiced by the
purported ineffective assistance. Gosch simply doesn't even start the legal analysis necessary to
survive summary disposition.
Gosch provides no evidence, other than bald, speculative assertions, of ineffective
assistance of counsel. On the contrary, Gosch maintains that he chose not to file an appeal; his
attorneys merely gave him advice that he chose to follow (page 2 of his "Petition and Affidavit
for Post-Conviction Relief,"). Petitioner does not even allege that his attorneys refused to file an
appeal on his behalf. Now, after his deadline has passed to file an appeal, Petitioner secondguesses his decision not to file an appeal.

Petitioner's regret in following his attorneys' advice

does not entitle him to post-conviction relief.
with sound advice regarding the appeal.

Conceivably, Gosch's attorneys provided him

Yet, Petitioner has provided no evidence to the

contrary. Gosch has the burden of making a prima facie case for each element he must prove to
avoid summary disposition, and he has failed to do so.

CONCLUSION
Gosch has the burden to allege genuine issues of material fact. He has failed to meet that
burden. Indeed, he has failed to even allege a proper legal argument, let alone to adduce
sufficient evidence to raise a prima facie case establishing each element he must prove. There is
simply nothing presented in Gosch's petition or affidavit that entitIes him to post-conviction
relief, even if taken at face value. The State asserts that it is entitled to summary disposition as a
matter of law and respectfully requests that Iglesias' petition for post-conviction be summarily
dismissed.
Dated this 12th day of March, 2009.
BARRY MCHUGH
Prosecuting Attorney for
Kootenai County, Idaho

~

TERRI LAI
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION - 5

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on the 12th day of March, 2009, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing "Brief in Support of State's Motion for Summary Disposition" was caused to be
mailed via U.S. mail, postage prepaid, or hand-delivered, or faxed, or delivered via interoffice
mail, to:
Jed K. Nixon
Public Defender's Office
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

KIRK J. GOSCH,
Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 07-5443

RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

------------~~----~------)
COMES NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho,

through the office of the Kootenai County

Prosecuting Attorney and hereby moves the Court for Summary Dismissal of the Amended
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief for the reasons addressed in the brief previously filed in this
matter.
DATED this

L

~~
day of June, 2009.

~~~

AIl

HUR VE

RE

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

.

It;'~y of June, 2009, a true and correct copy
foregoing was caused to be sent to Jed K. Nixon, ~liJ~;~_
I hereby certifY that on the
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STATE OF I[lAHO
}
COUNTY OF '<OOTENAI
FILED
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JEDK. NIXON
NIXON LAW OFFICE
409 Coeur d'Alene Avenue
P.O. Box 1560
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1560
Telephone: (208) 667-4655
FAX: (208) 765-4702
Idaho State Bar Number: 6598
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTlUCT COURT OF THE FIRST .nJDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

KIRK 1. GOSCH,

)

Petitioner,

)
) CASE NO.: CV 07-5443
)

VS.

) OBJECTION TO MOTION
) FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Respondent.

)
)

------------------------)
COMES NOW, the Petitioner, KIRK J. GOSCH, by and through his attorney of
record, JED K. NIXON of NIXON LAW OFFICE, and hereby objects to the Motion for

Summary Disposition as follows:
1.

This Motion is based on the files and records herein and such other and

further reasons and grounds to be provided at bearing hereon.
2.

Petitioner has submitted a genuine issue of material fact and requests an

Evidentiary Hearing be regularly set by the Court.

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

0,..)7 01

Petitioner requests the right to present oral argument and evidence at the hearing
for the Motion for Summary Dismissal; and will submit briefmg if so required by this
Court.

DATED this £~ay of July, 2009.

d K. Nixon
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on the Lt;'b--/day of .luly 2009, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:
Kootenai County Prosecutor
501 Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene. ID 83814

[]
[]
[]
~]

Hand-delivered
Regular mail
Certified mail
Fax: 208-446-1833

l'#!XON LAW OFFICE

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DTSPOSITION

STATE OF IDAHO }

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

KIRK JULLIARD GOSCH,
Petitioner,

Case No. CV-07-S443
ORDER

v.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

The Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District Judge, heard oral argument in the aboveentitled case on Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition on July 16,2009. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the Court advised the parties of its ruling. NOW, THEREFORE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, Petitioner is granted 60 days in which to file an amended
petition setting forth any legal grounds or other reasons as to why he would appeal his
conviction.
Dated this

17

day of July 2009.

The Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District Judge

ORDER

0f;.)-'9'

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY / MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of July 2009, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
faxed, to:
Jed Nixon
Fax: (208) 765-4702
~

Kootenai County Pro~~tor's Office
Fax: (208) 446-1833 ~

lR'o;l...

DANIEL ENGLISH
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Deputy Clerk

ORDER
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~

Linda J. Payne
Attorney at Law
Contract Public Defender
1034 N. Third Street, Suite 9
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho 83814
(208) 665~1303; 255-7555
(208) 667·8292 FAX
ISB #6222
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Att?rney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
KIRK JUILLARD GOSCH,

)

Plaintiff,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Defendant,

)
~

CASE NO.

CV-2007~5443

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF

->
STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of Kootenai

)

: S8

Plaintiff, KIRK JUILLARD GOSCH, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes
and says:

.

1. That I am the Petitioner in the above entitled matter, am over the age of 18
years, and am competent to testify herein.
2. After I was convicted by a jury in this matter on the marijuana-related charges
and found not guilty by a jury on the cocaine charge, I discussed the
possibility of appealing the guilty verdicts with my attorneys, Anne Taylor
and Christopher Schwartz.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED PETITION FOR peR - Page 1
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3.

They told me that ifI appealed the not guilty verdicts that I could be
recharged with the cocaine charge despite the fact that the jury found me
not guilty.

4.

I questioned them because that did not seem right to me. Upon
questioning, Mr. Schwartz toJ~ l?le that he had been a law clerk for the
Idaho Supreme CourtJCourt of Appeals and that he had done research on
this issue. He told me again that the law pennits the prosecutor to refile
the cocaine charge even though a jury found me not guilty.

S.

Because of my a.ttorneys' advice, I did not pursue an appeal. Had I not
been told by my attorneys that the cocaine charge could be refiled, I would
have timely filed an appeal. '

DATED this

-.-3.. day of March, 2008.

Notary Pu lic, State of 1 0
Employed at Coeur d' Alene, Idaho
Commission expires:
/6 ' ~/! IJ1J13

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AMENDED PETITION FOR PCR - Page 2

-......
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICCE

JK..

1 hereby certify that on the
day of August, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person in the following manner:
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

[ ] U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ] Overnight Mail
[ J Hand delivered
~aCSimile No.
r ] Courthouse Mail

( ] Other: _ _ _ _ _ __
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JEDK. NIXON
NIXON LAW OFFICE
409 Coeur d'Alene Avenue
P.O. Box 1560
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-1560
Telephone: (208) 667-4655
FAX: (208) 765-4702
Idaho State Bar Number: 6598
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

KIRK GOSCH,
Cy~/'-tJ

Petitioner,

Case No. CV 07..~

VS.

AMENDED PETITION FOR

POST CONVICTION RELIEF

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondant.

COMES NOW, the Petitioner, KIRK GOSCH, by and through his attorney of
record JED K. NIXON, of NIXON LAW OFFICE, and hereby amends his Petition for

Post Conviction Relief as follows:
1.

Petitioner is currently not in custody.

2.

The Court which imposed the sentence is the First Judicial District ofllie

State of Idaho, the County of Kootenai, The Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District

Judge, Presiding.

3.

The case number is CRF 2005·403. The sentence was imposed for a

conviction of one count of Manufacturing a Controlled Substance (Marijuana), Idaho
Code §37-2732(a), Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Deliver, Idaho Code §37·
2732(a) and Possession of Marijuana in Excess of Three Ounces, Idaho Code§37·
2732(e).
4.

The sentence was imposed on September 20, 2006. with a probation

violation disposition held October 18, 2006. The sentence was two years determinate,
plus three years indeterminate for a total unified sentence of five years. The sentence was
the same on each count, to run concurrently.
S.

A finding of guilty was made after a plea of not guilty.

6.

No appeal from the judgment of conviction was made.

7.

The ground upon which this Amended Application for Post Conviction

Reliefis based upon the ineffective assistance of Mr:Oosch's trial cOWlsel in violation of
his Sixth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution, for failure to timely fLle

Mr. Gosch's appeal.
8.

Pursuantto the Court's July 17,2009 Order, Mr. Gosch's legal grounds

for .tiling said appeal would have been as followed:
a.)

As a matter of law, Mr. Gosch was entitled to relief as
requested in his Motion to Suppress, argued in front of
Judge Hosack on January 13,2006; denied on January 30,
2006. More specifically Mr. Gosch argued evidence seized
by the State of Idaho should have been suppressed because:

AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST·CONVICTION RELIEF
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i.) The search warrant issued in this matter was

overbroad and based upon stale infonnation.
ii). The State's search of the white sedan was an
unlawful extension of the issued search warrant and
not subject to any exception to the warrant
requirement.
Further, the Court denied Mr. Gosch's Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal; the motion was argued on February
17, 2006; and subsequently denied on February 27, 2006.
b)

For any other such grounds or reasons as determined by
Mr. Gosch and appellate counsel, arising from the jury trial
beginning on July 25. 2006, resulting in a returned verdict
on July 27,2006.

9.

Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11, Mr. Gosch is entitled to an appeal as

a matter of right from a final judgment of conviction and/or any order made after
judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant.
10.

Prior to this Petition. the Petitioner has filed no state or federal habeas

corpus petitions; the Petitioner has filed no other petitions, motions or applications in any
other court.
WHERFORE, Petitioner prays as follows:
1.

The Court fmd the Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective in violation of

his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by not filing an appeal in a timely manner; or in
the alternative, for the Court to fmd Mr. Gosch's counsel was ineffective and in violation

AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST·CONVICTION RELlEF
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of his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by erroneously advising Mr. Gosch if he
appealed, he could be retried on the trafficking in cocaine charge, despite the jwy's not
guilty verdict. Said advice caused an appeal not to be filed, and thereby prejudiced Mr.
Gosch.
2.

That the Court grant Mr. Gosch 42 days from the entry of its Order on this

post conviction matter to flle an appeal.
3.

For any other further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

DATED this

I r~1

day of September, 2009.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

theLrJt~y

I HEREBY CERTIFY on
of September, 2009, I caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to
the following:

[ ] Hand-delivered
[ ] Regular Mail
~] Facsimile: 446·1833

KOOTENAI COUNTY PROSECUTOR
ARTHUR VERHAREN

J1~) ~ ~
ONxon TV

AMENDED PETiTION FOR
POST.CONVJCTION RELIEF
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STATE OF IDAHO
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

KIRK JULLIARD GOSCH,
Petitioner,

Case No. CV-07-S443
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,

~yJ firV\6fvOcD

Respondent.

FACTS
Petitioner Kirk Gosch was convicted by ajury in Kootenai county criminal case # CR-05403 of Manufacturing a Controlled Substance (Marijuana), Possession with Intent to Deliver and
Possession of Marijuana in Excess of Three Ounces. He was also found Not Guilty for
Possession of Cocaine. Petitioner was sentenced on September 20, 2006 to 2 years fixed and 3
years indeterminate. Petitioner never appealed his convictions. According to the affidavit ofMr.
Gosch, his attorney told him that ifhe appealed his convictions, the state could then recharge him
with the cocaine charge despite the fact that the jury found him not guilty. Mr. Gosch testifies
that he did not pursue an appeal due solely to the advice given by his attorney. Thereafter Mr.
Gosch filed this post-conviction relief action on July 27, 2007. The sole claim in his amended
petition is that the he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Mr. Gosch alleges

NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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that his counsel was ineffective in violation of his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel by
erroneously advising him that if he appealed, he could be retried on the cocaine charge
notwithstanding a not guilty jury verdict, and he further alleges that he was prejudiced by
refraining from filing an appeal in reliance upon the erroneous advice.

DISCUSSION

The differing standards between a post-conviction relief proceeding and an ordinary civil
action were set out in Hassettv. State, 127 Idaho 313, 900 P.2d 221 eCt. App. 1995). There the
court stated
An application for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts
within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other
evidence supporting its allegations must be attached or the application must state
why such supporting evidence is not included with the petition. I.C. § 19-4903. In
other words, the application must present or be accompanied by admissible
evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised
no genuine issue of material fact which, ifresolved in the applicant's favor, would
entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an
evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Summary dismissal of a petition for postconviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where the state does not
controvert the applicant's evidence, for the court is not required to accept either
the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence,
or the applicant's conclusions of law. (citations omitted)
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought under the Post-Conviction
Relief Act. Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403 (Ct. App. 1999). To succeed in proving a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel the applicant must meet a two-part test. First, the
applicant must show the attorney's conduct was not objectively reasonable. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988). Second, if the
attorney's assistance can be shown to be incompetent, the applicant must also show a reasonable

NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS PETITION FOR I'OST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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probability that the deficient conduct prejudiced the applicant's case. ld. The applicant for postconviction relief is required to make a prima facie case by presenting admissible evidence on
each essential element of his or her claim. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 518-19, 960 P .2d 738
(1998);

I.e.

§19-4903. The Court will address each element ofMr. Gosch's claim.

1) Prejudice

A petitioner must prove in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that, but for his
counsel's deficient performance the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. The reason being that the right to effective assistance of counsel is
recognized for the impact it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair and reliable trial or
appeal. Normally there is a strong presumption of reliability in judicial proceedings. A rebuttable
presumption arises which requires a strong showing by the defendant that "attorney error"
undermined the reliability of the proceeding. However, in the case where a petitioner was denied
ajudicial proceeding all together, there is no way to determine whether the outcome would have
been different or whether the proceeding is reliable, because the proceeding never existed.
Therefore, "when counsel's constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant of an
appeal that he otherwise would have taken, the defendant has made out a successful ineffective
assistance of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal" Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 484
(2000).
A component of the test in Roe requires the defendant to show that he "otherwise would
have taken" an appeal. In Roe the U.S. Supreme Court found that evidence that there were nonfrivolous grounds for appeal or that the defendant in question promptly expressed a desire to
appeal will be highly relevant in making this determination. That's not to say that a defendant's
inability to "specify the points he would raise were his right to appeal reinstated" will foreclose

NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
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the possibility that he can satisfy the prejudice requirement where there are other substantial
reasons to believe that he would have appealed.
In this case, Mr. Gosch does not specify the non-frivolous points he would raise were his
right to appeal reinstated. Although this is not a per se requirement as to the prejudice element,
he must present at least substantial reasons to believe that he would have appealed, but for the
erroneous advice of counsel. Here Mr. Gosch only submits his own affidavit stating that his
attorney gave him erroneous legal advice which caused him not to file an appeal that he
otherwise would have taken. The State argues that Mr. Gosch "offers no analysis whatsoever of
what specifically he would have appealed, what would be the likely result of an appeal, or how
an appeal would have likely affected his case." Mr. Gosch only states in an affidavit that he
would've appealed. Without knowing whether he had non-frivolous grounds for appeal the
Court finds no other substantial reason to believe that Mr. Gosch would've appealed, other than
his word. It would be helpful to make out a prima facie showing for the petitioner to submit
some evidence of his claims on appeal if it were reinstated.
2) Deficient Performance
An applicant for post-conviction relief is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary
hearing; if the applicant failed to present evidence establishing an essential element on which he
or she bears the burden of proof, summary dismissal is appropriate. Mata v. State, 124 Idaho
588,861 P.2d 1253 (Ct. App.1993). Where a defendant asks his attorney to appeal and the
attorney refuses, the defendant is deprived of effective assistance of counsel. Mata v. State, 124
Idaho 588, 593, 861 P.2d 1253, 1259 (CL App. 1993); Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792
P.2d 964,965 eCt. App. 1990). However, a defendant who initially requests an appeal may later
decide against it in reliance upon competent advice of counsel. If a lawyer appropriately advises
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against an appeal, and the defendant accepts that advice, there is no violation of the right to
effective assistance. Mala, 124 Idaho at 593. The prejudice inquiry is not wholly dissimilar
from the inquiry used to determine whether counsel performed deficiently in the first place. Roe
Specifically, both elements may be satisfied if the defendant shows non-frivolous grounds for
appeal. Id.
In this case Mr. Gosch alleges that the advice given to him by his attorneys concerning
the consequences of appeal was legally incorrect. In order to determine whether counsel in this
case performed deficiently it would appear that two inquiries are relevant. 1) Was the advice of
counsel as alleged by the petitioner, in fact legally erroneous, and 2) did the petitioner have nonfrivolous grounds for appealing.
Whether the advice as alleged by the petitioner is actually elToneous is a question of law.
Before the Court can address whether questions of fact exist as to Mr. Gosch's counsel's
performance, the threshold question of whether the advice was legally elToneous as alleged must
be answered. Neither party in this action has submitted legal briefing with regard to this issue.
On its own initiative, the Court has researched the issue and in the case of Green v. U.S the U.S.
Supreme Court directly addressed the issue of whether an appeal of a conviction on one count
opens the: door to be retried on a charge of which the defendant was acquitted. The Court held
unequivocally that where a person was tried and acquitted of a charge, but found guilty of second
charge and on appeal the conviction was reversed and remanded for a new trial, the state could
not twice put that person in jeopardy by trying him again for the charge for which he was
acquitted. Green v. U.S, 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
Counsel's advice in this case, that the petitioner could be re-tried for the charges for
which he was acquitted by a jury, was legally erroneous. However, the question of whether the
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petitioner otherwise had non-frivolous grounds for appeal has not been answered. It very well
could be that, even though counsel advised the defendant not to appeal based on an erroneous
interpretation of the law, petitioner did not have non-frivolous grounds to appeal anyway. Thus
the advice not to appeal would in reality be competent, regardless of counsel's reasoning for
giving the advice. Therefore, before the Court can determine whether issue of fact exist
regarding counsel's deficient performance, the question of whether the petitioner had nonfrivolous grounds for appeal must be addressed.

CONCLUSION
Having reviewed Mr. Gosch's petition for post-conviction relief this Court finds it
necessary to determine whether petitioner had non-frivolous grounds for appeal before the
motion for summary disposition can be fully addressed. The Court grants leave of 20 days for the
petitioner to file an amended petition showing non-frivolous grounds for appeal. If after 20 days
the petitioner has not come forth with an amended petition, the Court will grant the respondent's
motion for summary disposition.

Dated

thiS~ of~(j 'J-G/O
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
MIl
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I herby certify that on this d' '..:...'day of..JtH.y, ~ a true and correct copy of the
•

I

foregoing was mailed / delivered by regular U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, interoffice mail, hand
delivered, or faxed to:

Jed Nixon, Public Defender's Office
Fax: 208·-446=176t ,&S""- Lf7b;;l.

Kootenai County Prosecutor
Fax: 208-446-1833

CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By
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Deputy Clerk

STATE: OF IDAdO
}
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
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JED K. NIXON
CONFLICT PUBLIC DEFENDER
409 Coeur d'Alene Avenue
P.O. Box 1560
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816·1560
Telephone: (208) 667-4655
FAX: (208) 765·4702
Idaho State Bar Number: 6598
Conflict Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
KIRK GOSCH,
Petitioner,

Case No. CV 07·0005443

VS.

AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

COMES NOW, the Petitioner, KIRK GOSCH, by and through his attorney of record

JED K. NIXON, Conflict Public Defender, and hereby amends his Petition for Post Conviction
Relief as follows:
1.

Petitioner is currently in custody.

2.

The Court which imposed the sentence is the First Judicial District of the State of

Idaho, the County of Kootenw, The Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District Judge, Presiding.

AMENDED PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF
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3.

The case number is CRF 2005-403. The sentence was imposed for a conviction

of one (1) count of Manufacturing a Controlled Substance (Marijuana), Idaho Code §37-2732(a),
one (1) count of Possession of Marijuana with Intent to Deliver, Idaho Code §37-2732(a), and
one (1) count of Possession of Marijuana in Excess of Three (3) Ounces, Idaho Code §372732(e).
4.

On September 20, 2006, the sentence of two (2) years determinate plus three (3)

years indeterminate for a total unified sentence offive (5) years was imposed.
5.

After Mr. Gosch plead not guilty, ajury made a finding of guilty after trial.

6.

No appeal from the Judgment and Sentencing Disposition was made.

7.

No transcript was ever requested or provided for the purposes of an appeal.

8.

The ground upon which this Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief is

sought is the violation of Mr. Gosch's Sixth Amendment rights under the United States
Constitution. Mr. Gosch's original counsel gave him erroneous advice which led to the failure of

Mr. Gosch's second counsel to timely file an appeal on his behalf.
9.

Pursuant to the Memorandum Opinion on Respondent's Motion for Summary

Disposition entered on June 23, 2010 by Judge Simpson, Mr. Gosch's legal grounds for filing
said appeal are as follows:
A.)

As a matter of law, Mr. Gosch was entitled to relief as requested in his

Motion to Suppress argued in front of Judge Hosack on January 13,2006, and denied on January
30, 2006. More specifically, Mr. Gosch argued evidence seized by the State of Idaho should
have been suppressed because:
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1.) The search warrant issued in this matter was overbroad and based
upon stale information.

2.) The State's search of the white sedan was an unlawful extension of the
issued search warrant and not subject to any exception to the warrant
requirement.
Further, the Coun denied Mr. Gosch's Motion for Interlocutory Appeal;
the motion was argued on February 17, 2006 and subsequently denied on
February 27 t 2006.
B.)

A Motion to Enforce the Plea Agreement was fued on February 9, 2006,

and which was denied on February 17, 2006. Mr. Gosch would like to a file an appeal of the
Court's denial of this Motion.
C.)

For any other such grounds or reasons as determined by Mr; Gosch and

appellate counsel arising from the jury trial beginning on July 25, 2006, and resulting in a
conviction on July 27, 2006.
10.

Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11, Mr. Gosch is entitled to an appeal as a

matter of right from a fmal judgment of conviction andlor any order made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the Defendant.
11.

Prior to this Petition, the Petitioner has flied no state or federal habeas corpus

petitions; the Petitioner has filed no other petitions, motions or applications in any other court.
12.

The Petitioner reserves his right to assert other issues of appeal.
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WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays as follows:
I.

For an Order finding the Petitioner's trial counsel ineffective and in

violation of his Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel.
2.

For an Order granting Mr. Gosch forty-two (42) days from the entry of its

Order on this post conviction matter to file an appeal.

3.

DATED this

For any other further relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

i1 tr-I day of July, 2010.

CERTIFICATE OF' SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY on the.u.:

Jay of July, 2010, I caused to be served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

[ ] Hand-delivered
[ ] Regular Mail
[>-] Facsimile: 446·1833

KOOTENAI COUNTY PROSECUTOR
ARTHUR VERHAREN

AMENDED PETITION FOR
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UNIFORM PRETRIAL ORDER

In order to assist with the trial of this matter IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1.

DISCOVERY:

All written discovery shall be initiated so that timely responses shall be completed
thiIiy-five (35) days before trial. The last day for taking any discovery depositions shall
be twenty-one (21) days before trial.

2.

EXPERT WITNESSES:

Not later than one hundred fifty (150) days before trial, Plaintiff(s) shall disclose
all experts to be called at trial. Not later than ninety (90) days before, Defendant(s) shall
disclose all experts to be called at trial. Such disclosure shall consist of at least the
infonnation required to be disclosed pursuant to LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(i). Notice of
compliance shall be contemporaneously filed with the Court.

3.

PRETRIAL MOTIONS:

Motions for summary judgment shall be timely filed so as to be heard not later
than sixty (60) days before trial. (NOTICE: DUE TO COURT CONGESTION IT IS
ADVISABLE TO CONTACT THE COURT FOR SCHEDULING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTIONS AT LEAST 90 DAYS PRIOR TO HEARING.) Motions in
..

limine conceming designated witnesses and exhibits shall be submitted in wIlting at lease
seven (7) days before blal. The last day for hearing all other pretrial motions including
other motions in limine shall be twenty-one (21) days before trial.

4.

MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

There shall be served and filed with each motion for summary judgment a
separate concise statement, together with a reference to the record, of each of the material
facts as to which the moving pmiy contends there are no genuine issues of dispute. Any
party opposing the motion shall, not later than fourteen (14) days after the service of the
motion for summary judgment and the statement of facts, serve and file a separate
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concise statement, together with a reference to the record, setting forth all material facts
as to which it is contended there exist genuine issues necessary to be litigated.
In detelmining any motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that the
facts as claimed by the moving patiy are admitted to exist without controversy, except
and to the extend that such facts are asserted to be actually in good faith controverted by
a statement filed in opposition to the motion.

5.

DISCOVERY DISPUTES:

Unless otherwise ordered, the Court will not entertain any discovery motion,
except those brought by a person appearing pro se and those brought pursuant to LR.C.P.
26(c) by a person who is not a party, unless counsel for the moving party files with the
Court, at the time of filing the motion, a statement showing that the lawyer making the
motion has made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing counsel on the
matters set forth in the motion. The motion shall not refer the COUli to other documents
in the file. For example, if the sufficiency of an answer to an inten-ogatory is in issue, the
motion shall contain, verbatim, both the inten-ogatory and the allegedly insufficient
answer, followed by each party's contentions, separately stated.

6.

EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS:

Exhibit lists and copies of exhibits shall be prepared and exchanged between
parties and filed with the Clerk at least fourteen (14) days before trial. The original
exhibits should be filed with the Clerk at the time of trial. Using the attached fOD11, each
patiy shall prepare a list of exhibits, it expects to offer. Two copies of the exhibit list are
to be filed with the Clerk, and a copy is to be provided to opposing parties. Exhibits
should be listed in the order that the party anticipates they will be offered. Exhibit labels
can be obtained from the COUli Clerk. Each patiy shall affix labels to their exhibits
before trial. After the labels are marked and attached to the original exhibit, copies
should be made. Plaintiff s exhibits should be marked in numerical sequence.
Defendant's exhibits should be marked in alphabetical sequence. The civil action
number of the case and the date ofthe trial should also be placed on each of the exhibit
labels. It is expected that each paliy will have a copy of all exhibits to be used at trial.
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LIST OF WITNESSES:

7.

Witness lists shall be prepared and exchanged between pmiies and filed with the
Clerk at least fOUlieen (14) days before trial. Each party shall provide opposing parties
with a list of the pmiy's witnesses and shall provide the Court with two copies of each list
of witnesses. Witnesses should be listed in the order they are anticipated to be called.

8.

BRIEFS AND MEMORANDA:

In addition to any original brief or memorandum filed with the Clerk of Court, a
copy shall be provided to the Court. To the extent counsel rely on legal authorities not'
contained in the Idaho Reports, a copy of each case or authority cited shall be attached to
the Court's copy of the brief or memorm1dum.

9.

TRIAL BRIEFS:

Trial briefs shall be prepared and exchanged between the parties and filed with
the Clerk at least seven (7) days before trial.

10.

PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:

If the trial is to the Court, each party shall at least seven (7) days prior to trial file
with the opposing parties and the Court, proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Supporting their position.

11.

MODIFICATION:

This Pretrial Order may be modified by stipulation of the pmiies upon entry of an
order by the Court approving such stipulation. Any party may, upon motion and for good
cause shown, seek leave ofCoUli modifying the tel111S of this order, upon such terms and
conditions as the Court deems fit. Any party may request a pretrial conference pursuant
to LR.C.P. 16(i).
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12.

SANCTIONS FOR NONCONFORMANCE:

Failure to timely comply in all respects with the provisions ofthis order shall
subject non-complying parties to sanctions pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 16(i), which may
include:
(a)

An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or

oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting such patty from introducing
designated matters in evidence;
(b)

An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further

proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient patty;
(c)

In lieu of any ofthe foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an

order threatening as a contempt of Court the failure to comply;
(d)

In lieu or in addition to any other sanction, the Judge shall require

the patty or the attorney representing such party or both to pay the reasonable expenses
incUlTed because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attomey's fees, unless
the Judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any vacation or continuation of the trial date
shall not change or alter any of the discovery or disclosure dates established by the initial
trial setting. Any PaJty may, upon motion and for good cause shown, request that the
discovery and disclosure dates be altered on vacation or continuance of the trial date.
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LIST OF EXHIBITS

CASE NUMBER: ___________________

DATE_______________

TITLE OF CASE,_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _--!..V=S:....."_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Plaintiff s Exhibits (List Numerically)
Defendant's Exhibits (List Alphabetically)
Third Party Exhibits (State Party)
Additional Defendants (Contact Judge's Clerk for Directions)

#

Description

Admitted/
Admitted By Stip
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STA7 E OF IDAHO
}
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI SS

FILED:

ZOl/APR21 PH ~:5'
SEAN P. WALSH
WALSH LAW OFFICE, PLLC
206 Indiana Street, Suite 117
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814
Phone: 208-665-7400
Fax: 208-765-4636
ISBN: 7235
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
KIRK J GOSCH,
Plaintiff,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NUMBER CV-2007-5443
PRETRIAL COMPLIANCE

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Kirk J. Gosch, by and through his attorney of record, Sean P. Walsh
of the law firm WALSH LAW OFFICE, PLLC, and in compliance with the pretrial and scheduling
order, hereby submits the following:
1. Witnesses: Kirk Gosch, Petitioner herein.
2. Exhibit List: See Attached.
3. Points and Authorities: Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356 (Ct. App. 1994)
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day of April, 2011.

DATED this

WALSH LAW OFFICE, PLLC;

By:
Attorney at Law

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

--z. I

day of April, 2011, I caused to be served a true and

correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:

[ ] U.s. Mail
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
208-446-1833
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Hand Delivered
Fax
Overnight Mail

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

~
Case No. ~05-403

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY
APPEAL

KIRK GOSCH,

Defendant.

Before the Court is Defendant Kirk Gosch's Motion for Interlocutory Appeal. Defendant
moves for an interlocutory appeal of two of this Court's orders: 1) the order denying Defendant's
motion to suppress, and 2) the order denying Defendant's motion to enforce the plea agreement.
The Court heard oral argument on Defendant's motion on February 17, 2006. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement to be ruled on within the 14-day time
period provided in Appellate Rule 12(b).
Appellate Rule 12 provides the mechanism by which a party may seek an appeal of an
interlocutory order of a district court. The party must first seek pennission to appeal from the
district court, then seek acceptance of the appeal from the Supreme Court. I.A.R. 12(b) and (c).
Permission may be granted where the order in question involves a "controlling question of law as
to which there is substantial grounds for difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL
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from the order may materially advance the orderly resolution ofthe litigation." I.A.R. 12(a). As
the Supreme Court explained in Budell v. Todd, 105 Idaho 2,665 P.2d 701 (1983), "It was the
intent ofLA.R. 12 to provide an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order if substantial legal
issues of great public interest or legal questions offrrst impression are involved." Budell, at 4,
665 P.2d at 703. The Budell Court further explained:
The [Supreme] Court also considers such factors as the impact of an immediate
appeal upon the parties, the effect of the delay of the proceedings in the district
court pending the appeal, the likelihood or possibility of a second appeal after
judgment is fmally entered by the district court, and the case workload of the
appellate courts. No single factor is controlling in the Court's decision of
acceptance or rejection of an appeal by certification, but the Court intends by Rule
12 to create an appeal in the exceptional case and does not intend by the rule to
broaden the appeals which may be taken as a matter of right under LA.R. 11.

Defendant asserts that his motion to enforce the plea agreement he entered into with the
State raises an issue of first impression regarding the extent to which contract law should be
applied in the context of plea agreements. This Court disagrees. The plea agreement in this case
provided that Defendant was to complete two tasks. Whether or not Defendant accomplished
these tasks would be a determination made "solely by the State." (Plea Agreement, Exhibit A to
Defendant's Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement.) The testimony at the hearing was that the State
did not consider Defendant to have fulfilled his end of the plea agreement. The Court's decision
to deny Defendant's motion to enforce the agreement was thus made on purely factual grounds
and involves no substantial legal issue or legal question of first impression. Accordingly, the
Court denies Defendant's request for an interlocutory appeal of the order denying Defendant's
Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement.
Defendant also asserts that his Motion to Suppress presents a question of first impression
in regards to the warrantless search of Defendant's vehicle, while his vehicle was parked in his
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private driveway. While it is true that no reported cases in Idaho have ever dealt with the use of
a drug detecting dog unit to inspect a vehicle parked in a private driveway, there are ample cases
discussing the use of a drug detecting dog during the scope of a valid traffic stop, ~ State v.
Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 979 P.2d 1199 (1999); Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 821 P.2d 949 (1991);
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 108 P.3d 424 (Ct. App. 2005), as well as the authority of the
police to search without a warrant a vehicle parked in a private driveway pursuant to the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement, ~ United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856 (9th
Cir.1994); United States v. Markham, 844 F.2d 366 (6th Cir.1988); State v. Bottelson, 102 Idaho
90,625 P.2d 1093 (1981). In addition, this Court reads State v. Sapp, 110 Idaho 153, 715 P.2d
366 (Ct. App. 1986), to support the conclusion that the police were lawfully on the premises to
be searched pursuant to a search warrant when they employed the use of a drug detection dog in
the Defendant's driveway. Consequently, it is this Court's determination that it has merely
applied existing case law to the facts of the present case, not issued an order involving a legal
question of first impression. NOW, THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that Defendant's Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal is denied.
Dated this

eX ¥

day of February, 2006.

The Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District Judge
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ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

~;"05-403

MEMORANDUM OPINION

VS.

KIRKJ. GOSCH,
Defendant.

Art Verharan, Kootenai Co. Prosecutor's Office, for Plaintiff.
Anne Taylor, Kootenai Co. Public Defender's Office, for Defendent.

I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 2, 2004, Defendant Kirk Gosch was stopped in his vehicle by
Hayden City police officers and cited for possession of marijuana and paraphernalia.
Defendant's criminal history includes a prior arrest, in October 2003, for possession of
paraphernalia. This infonnation was communicated to the Idaho State Police (hereinafter
"ISP"). At the time, the ISP had reports dating back approximately two years of
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Defendant's involvement in a marijuana smuggling operation between Canada and
Kootenai County.
In late December, the ISP conducted a garbage pull at Defendant's residence,
Officers found several plastic baggies with corners cut off, as well as some baggies with a
white powdery substance in them.
On January 6,2005, the ISP initiated surveillance on the Defendant's residence,
during which officers conducted another garbage pull. As a result of that pull, officers
found heat-sealed plastic bags, some bearing labels of "A" or "B," which markings are
used to denote grades of marijuana from Canada. Officers also found plant stems, which
tested positive for marijuana, several large butane gas cylinders, and two broken glass
jars, which tested positive for THC. Last, officers found several zip lock baggies
emanating a strong odor of marijuana and containing a green leafy substance.
As a result of this evidence, ISP Detective Morgan requested a search warrant for
Defendant's residence and vehicle. The magistrate court granted a search warrant for
11974 N. Rimrock Road, Kootenai County, ID, and for a black 1996 Jeep registered to
the Defendant. The warrant authorized officers to search for evidence and fruits of the
crimes of Trafficking in Marijuana and Conspiracy to Traffic in Marijuana.
Prior to execution of the search warrant, one of the surveillance officers, ISP
Detective Carlock, observed Defendant and two other individuals carrying items from
Defendant's residence to an area in which two vehicles were parked. From Detective
Carlock's position, she could not always detect which vehicle the items were loaded into.
However, Detective Carlock testified that she observed items being placed into a black
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Jeep, and, on at least one occasion, she observed Defendant load items into a white
Suzuki.
The search warrant was executed at approximately 1:30 p.m. During execution of
the warrant, a canine unit was used to investigate two vehicles located on the premises
but not listed in the search warrant: a white Suzuki sedan registered to Defendant, and a
white GMC pickup truck. Cocaine and marijuana were subsequently found in the trunk
of the Suzuki.
In the house, officers found several devices used for the ingestion of marijuana
and several glass vials, which contained suspected "honey oil" (a refmed marijuana
substance). Officers also seized from the house mUltiple empty glass vials, packaging
materials, a bottle ofMSM (commonly used as a cuttinglbulking additive for cocaine
distribution), and scales.
Defendant was subsequently charged with Trafficking in Cocaine, Manufacturing
a Controlled Substance, Possession of a Controlled Substance with the Intent to Deliver,
and Possession of Marijuana in Excess of Three Ounces. Defendant now moves for the
suppression of evidence seized from his residence and the white Suzuki, on the grounds
that the search warrant was improperly based on stale infonnation and overly broad and
that the search of the Suzuki was an impermissible extension of the search warrant and
not within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.
The State argues first that there is nothing in the record that would allow the
Court to fmd that the search warrant was not properly based on probable and cause and
overly broad, due to the Defendant's failure to request and make available a transcript of
the search warrant hearing. Therefore, the Court should presume that probable cause
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existed to support the search warrant issued. Second, the State argues that, because there
existed probable cause to believe contraband would be found in the Suzuki, the search of
the Suzuki was within the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.
Alternatively, the State argues that the doctrine of inevitable discovery should be applied
so as to prevent suppression of the evidence seized from the Suzuki.
For the reasons discussed in this memorandum opinion, Defendant's motion to
suppress is denied.

II.
DISCUSSION
A.

The Court Cannot Conclude that the Search Warrant Lacked
Probable Cause or Was Overbroad.

Defendant argues that the evidence seized from his residence should be
suppressed on the grounds that the warrant authoriZing the search of the residence was
improperly based on stale information and overly broad. The State argues in response
that there is nothing before the Court which would allow the Court to make such a
determination, since the Defendant has not placed into the record a transcript of the
search warrant hearing.
In reviewing a lower court's determination of probable cause, an appellate court
examines the warrant affidavit submitted to the magistrate to determine whether it
provided the magistrate with a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed. State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680,662, 85 P.3d 656,686 (2004). Where sworn
testimony at a search warrant hearing takes the place of a warrant affidavit, the testimony
is part of the appellate record and is reviewed in transcript form. See Id. Great deference
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is given to the probable cause determinations of magistrates, and doubts are resolved in
favor of the warrant. Id.
A defendant challenging a magistrate court's issuance of a warrant in the context
of a motion to suppress before the district court is essentially an appellant claiming error
in a lower court's decision. It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to
provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the
claims of error. State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34, 981 P.2d 754, 759 (Ct. App. 1999).
Where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to
support the actions of the trial court. Id.
Although Defendant's counsel invites the Court to take judicial notice of the
testimony before the magistrate court when it made the decision to issue a search warrant
for Defendant's residence, counsel does not provide the Court with a method by which
the Court may review said testimony. Defendant has neither provided the Court with a
copy of a transcript of the search warrant hearing, nor cited to the record with any
specificity as to which facts relied upon by the magistrate court were stale and therefore
did not add up to probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant. Instead,
Defendant's counsel simply suggests that the Court obtain a tape of the search warrant
hearing and make its detennination upon review of the tape.
The burden is on the defendant to establish that the issuance of a search warrant
was not supported by probable cause. State v. Patterson, 139 Idaho 858, 863, 87 P.3d
967,972 (Ct. App. 2004). Having failed to provide an adequate record from which the
Court may make such a determination, Defendant has failed to meet this burden.
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Accordingly, the Court cannot find that the search wan'ant issued for Defendant's
residence and Jeep lacked probable cause or was overly broad.

B.

The Search of the Suzuki was Within the Automobile Exception to the
Warrant Requirement.

The State argues that the facts known to the officers at Defendant's residence, at
the time of the execution of the search warrant, established probable cause to believe the
Suzuki contained evidence of a crime. Having probable cause, the officers were then
permitted to search the Suzuki without obtaining a warrant. In response, Defendant urges
this Court to distinguish between the circumstances of this case and the usual traffic stop,
during which it is well-established law that an officer may employ the use of a narcotic
detecting dog to sniff the exterior ofa lawfully stopped vehicle.
Both the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I of the Idaho
Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. The warrantless search of an
automobile is presumptively unreasonable; however, this presumption may be overcome,
if the evidence establishes that the search comes within one of the few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement or was otherwise
reasonable under the circumstances. See State v. Weaver. 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d
196, 198 (1995). The burden of overcoming a presumption of unreasonableness is on the
state. See Id.; See also Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11, 13 (1999).
Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, police may search an
automobile and the containers within it when they have probable cause to believe that the
automobile contains contraband or evidence of a crime. State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,
_ , 108 P.3d 424, 428 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Gallegos. 120 Idaho 894, 898,
821 P.2d 949,953 (1991). The exception is based upon "both the automobile's ready
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mobility ... and upon the lesser expectation of privacy in an automobile as compared to
the privacy interest in a home." Gibson, at _ , 108 P.3d at 428-429 (citing California v.
Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390- 92 (1985), and State v. Bottelson 102 Idaho 90, 93, 625 P.2d
1093, 1096 (1981)). As a result, courts have focused on the apparent ready mobility and
location of a subject vehicle when deciding whether or not the automobile exception
should apply. The Supreme Court in Carney explained:
When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of
such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for
residential pmposes--temporary or otherwise--the two justifications for the
vehicle exception come into play. First, the vehicle is obviously readily
mobile by the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving. Second,
there is a reduced expectation of privacy stemming from its use as a
licensed motor vehicle subject to a range of police regulation inapplicable
to a fixed dwelling. At least in these circumstances, the overriding
societal interests in effective law enforcement justify an immediate search
before the vehicle and its occupants become unavailable.
Carney, at 392-393.

As the above-cited language and existing case law make clear, the automobile
exception is not limited to vehicles stopped on a highway, but extends to vehicles parked
in private driveways. See ~ United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856, 859 (9th Cir.l994)
(holding that the automobile exception applied to an apparently mobile vehicle parked in
a private driveway, even though the vehicle was later discovered to be inoperable);
United States v. Markham, 844 F.2d 366,368 (6th Cir.1988) (concluding that the
automobile exception applied to an unoccupied motor home parked in a private
driveway). See also State v. Bottelson 102 Idaho 90, 625 P.2d 1093 (1981) (holding that
automobile exception applied to vehicle parked in private driveway, where there was
"abundant" probable cause to suspect that a burglary was in progress).
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In the present case, Defendant contends that since the Suzuki "was not about to
be moved" and was "secure where it was," the mobility concerns that justify the
automobile exception were not present when the Suzuki was searched without a warrant.
This assertion is simply not supported by existing case law. The distinction between
vehicles that may be searched without a warrant and those that may not is not made based
on whether or not the subject vehicle is "secure" or "not about to be moved." Rather, the
distinction primarily rests on the ability of the subject vehicle to be readily moved to
another location. Here, the Suzuki was located in a driveway in close proximity to
Defendant's residence. There was no testimony that it was mounted on blocks, had flat
tires or was otherwise inoperable. Cf. Hatley, at 859. Contrary to Defendant's argument,
the actions of the Defendant on the day of the search indicate that he was using, or was
about to use, both the Suzuki and the Jeep to transport belongings from his residence to
another location, which in and ofitselfindicates that the Suzuki was capable of being
moved in the manner contemplated by the automobile exception. The fact that the
Suzuki was parked in a residential driveway and without an operator when the
warrantless search commenced does not place the Suzuki outside of the automobile
exception.
Having found the Suzuki to be a readily mobile vehicle within the meaning of the
automobile exception, the Court now turns to the question of whether or not the police
had probable cause to suspect the Suzuki contained contraband or evidence of a crime.
When a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that a lawfully stopped vehicle contains the
odor of controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are
drugs in the vehicle and may search it without a warrant. State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277,
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_ , 108 P.3d 424,428 (citing State v. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843,979 P.2d 1199, 1201
(1999), and Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 898,821 P.2d at 953)). Allowing the dog to sniff
along the outside of a motor vehicle does not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301,307 (Ct. App. 2000).
Kootenai County Police Deputy Shaw was called by the ISP to assist in the
execution of the search warrant. When Deputy Shaw arrived, execution of the search
warrant was already underway. Like the other officers at Defendant's residence, Deputy
Shaw and his dog, Karo, were lawfully on the premises. Cf. State v. Sapp, 110 Idaho
153, 715 P.2d 366 (eL App. 1986) (holding that the backyard of a residence was within
the scope ofa search warrant authorizing a search of the "premises"). While lawfully on
the premises, Deputy Shaw walked Karo around the GMC pickup and Suzuki. Karo
exhibited several changes of behavior relevant to the Suzuki, which indicated to Deputy
Shaw'that Karo was detecting the odor of narcotics on or in the Suzuki, although Karo
could not, from the exterior, pinpoint the source of the odor. At this point, Deputy Shaw
had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the Suzuki. As Karo's handler
since 2002, Deputy Shaw was trained and experienced in recognizing the changes in
Karo's behavior as indicative of the presence of at least the odor of controlled substances.
Karo is certified as a narcotics detecting dog in both Washington and Idaho, and there is
sufficient evidence in the record establishing that Karo is reliable in this regard.
Having observed an alert to the presence of the odor of a controlled substance by
a reliable narcotics detecting dog, the officers in the present case had probable cause to
believe that the Suzuki contained contraband or evidence of a crime. The officers were
permitted to search the vehicle without obtaining a warrant. Although the use of the
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canine unit in this case was net in the centext ef a reutine traffic step, as is the usual
canine unit scenario. involved in Idahe's reperted cases, the Ceurt finds that its use did
net vielate the Defendant's Censtitutienal rights.

III.
CONCLUSION
Fer the feregeing reasons, Defendant's Motion to' Suppress is denied.

Entered this

7

~

day of January, 2006.

C

L-)

ClJQo .. --

Charles W. Hesack, District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILINGIDELIVERY
On this

30

day ef January, 2006, a true and cerrect cepy ef the feregeing

was mailed in the U.S. Mail, pestage prepaid, sent via facsimile, er sent via interoffice
mail as indicated below to' the fellowing ceunsel:

Keetenai Ceunty Presecuter's Office
Art Verharen
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
VS.

KIRK JUILLARD GOSCH
DOB:
SSN:
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CRF 2005-403
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCING
DISPOSITION

On September 13, 2006, before the Honorable Charles W. Hosack, District Judge, you,
KIRK JUILLARD GOSCH, personally appeared for sentencing. Also appearing were Blake
Swenson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, Idaho, and your lawyer,
Christopher Schwartz, Deputy Public Defender for Kootenai County, Idaho.
WHEREUPON, the previously ordered presentence report having been filed, and the
Court having ascertained that you have had an opportunity to read the presentence report and
review it with your lawyer, and you having been given the opportunity to explain, correct or
deny parts of the presentence report, and having done so, and you having been given the
opportunity to make a statement, and defendant having done so, and recommendations having
been made by counsel for the State and by your lawyer, and there being no legal reason given
why judgment and sentence should not then be pronounced, the Court did then pronounce its
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sentencing disposition as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT YOU, KIRK JUILLARD GOSCH, after
exercising your right to a jury trial, and the jury having entered a verdict of guilty to the criminal
offense charged in the Information on file herein as follows:
COUNT II - MANUFACTURING A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
(MARIJUANA), a felony, Idaho Code §37-2732(a),
COUNT III - POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA WITH INTENT TO DELIVER, a"
felony, Idaho Code §37-2732(a), and
COUNT IV - POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA IN EXCESS OF THREE OUNCES,
a felony, Idaho Code §37-2732(e),
that you, KIRK JUILLARD GOSCH, are guilty of the crime(s) so charged.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you, KIRK JUILLARD GOSCH, are sentenced to
the Idaho State Board of Correction as follows:
COUNT II -For a total unified sentence not to exceed five (5) years,
commencing with a fixed period of two (2) years, to be
followed by an additional indeterminate period of
three (3) years,
COUNT III - For a total unified sentence not to exceed five (5) years,
commencing with a fixed period of two (2) years, to be
followed by an additional indeterminate period of
three (3) years, and
COUNT IV - For a total unified sentence not to exceed five (5) years,
commencing with a fixed period of two (2) years, to be
followed by an additional indeterminate period of
three (3) years,
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said sentences to run concurrently with each other.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the execution of sentence be suspended for a period
of three (3) years and six (6) months, during which time you will be on supervised probation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that in the presence of your probation officer, you shall
on a certified copy of this order endorse your receipt of a copy of this order and shall have
initialed your acceptance, agreement, and consent to each of the terms and conditions contained
in this order. Your probation officer shall return to the court the certified copy which contains
your endorsement.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that you, KIRK JUILLARD GOSCH, comply with
each of the following TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PROBATION:
1.

That you shall pay a fine of $1 ,000.00.

2.

That you shall pay court costs and fees of$107.50 on each charge.

3.

That you shall pay additional costs, fees, restitutions and reimbursements as

follows:

f.
g.

h.
4.

Reimburse defense costs
Reimburse prosecution costs
Reimburse the District Court Fund

150.00
150.00
150.00

All of the above sums shall be paid to the Kootenai County Clerk at the Kootenai

County Courthouse, in monthly installments to be determined by your probation officer, based
upon your ability to pay. Based upon a periodic review of your financial circumstances, your
probation officer may increase or decrease the amount of your monthly payment, it being the
intent that your financial obligations under this sentence be paid in full prior to your discharge
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from probation. All payments shall be made in the form of cash, cashier's check or money order.
The clerk shall distribute the payments in the priority set by the Idaho Supreme Court.
5.

That you shall pay to the Idaho Department of Corrections its costs of supervision

of your probation, in an amount not to exceed the maximum allowable by Idaho Code §20-225.
6.

That the Court shall reserve jurisdiction to determine the amount of restitution

you shall pay in this matter. Once determined, restitution shall be paid on a scheduled to be
determined by your probation officer as a term of your probation.
7.

That you shall serve one hundred eighty (180) days local incarceration in the

Kootenai County Jail commencing on September 22, 2006 at the hour of 5 :00 P.M. Work release
and treatment release is granted.
8.

That you shall attend and complete any rehabilitation, educational, and vocational

training programs as your probation officer may designate.
9.

That you shall make every effort to obtain and maintain full time employment or

be enrolled in a full time educational program.
10.

That you shall undergo at your own expense a substance abuse evaluation if

requested by your probation officer and you shall attend and successfully complete any
substance abuse and mental health counseling which your probation officer may designate.
11.

That you shall comply with all of the rules, regulations and requirements of the

Idaho Department of Corrections.
12.

That you will be supervised at any level deemed necessary by the Department of

Correction, including the use of an electronic home monitoring device or interlock device.
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13.

That you shall commit no violations of any law ofthe United States of America, or of

any law of any other country, or of any law of any state county, city, or other political subdivision.
14.

That you shall consume no alcoholic beverages during the period of your .

probation.
15.

That you shall not enter any establishment wherein the primary source of revenue

is the sale of alcoholic beverages.
16.

That you shall not use or possess any controlled substances except pursuant to a

valid prescription, nor enter any establishment or frequent any home, business, or other premises
where there are illegal controlled substances or drug paraphernalia, or is occupied by or
frequented by drug users.
17.

That you shall not associate with any individuals specified by your probation

18.

That you shall submit to analysis of your blood, breath or urine at your own

officer.

expense at the request of your probation officer or any law enforcement officer.
19.

That you shall not purchase, possess, or use any substance intended to alter the

results of urinalysis testing for the presence of controlled substances or alcohol.
20.

That you shall submit to searches of your person, personal property, automobiles,

and residence without a search warrant at the request of your probation officer.
21.

By accepting this probation you do hereby waive extradition to the State ofIdaho

and also agree that you will not contest any effort by any State to return you to the State of
Idaho.
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22.

That you shall, at the request of your probation officer, submit to a polygraph

examination at your expense.
23.

If requested by your probation officer, youwill be required to reside within the

State of Idaho.
24.

That in addition to any other local incarceration you are given ninety (90) days in

the county jail to be served and imposed at the discretion of your probation officer and upon the
written approval of the District Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as long as you, KIRK JUILLARD GOSCH, abide
by and perform all of the foregoing conditions, execution of the original judgment and sentence
will continue to be suspended. If you violate any of the terms and conditions of your probation,
you will be brought before the Court for execution of the balance of your sentence.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any bail posted in this matter shall be exonerated,
provided that any deposit shall be applied pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2923.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
YOU, KIRK JUILLARD GOSCH, ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that you have a right
to appeal this order to the Idaho Supreme Court. Any notice of appeal must be filed within fortytwo (42) days of the entry of the written order in this matter.
YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that if you are unable to pay the costs of an appeal,
you have the right to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis or to apply for the appointment
of counsel at public expense. If you have questions concerning your right to appeal, you should
consult your present lawyer.
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DATED this

I~

day of September, 2006.

~wCCiQ2· /'
CH
W. HOSACK
DISTRICT JUDGE

RECEIPT BY DEFENDANT
I, KIRK JUILLARD GOSCH, hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of the foregoing order
and hereby accept and agree to the above terms and conditions of probation. By accepting this
probation, I do hereby agree that ifI am placed on probation to a destination outside the State of
Idaho, or ifI leave the confines of the State ofIdaho, with or without the permission of my
probation officer, I do hereby waive extradition to the State ofIdaho. I further agree that I will
not contest any effort by any State to return me to the State of Idaho.
DATED this_ _ _day of September, 2006.

WITNESS

DEFENDANT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ::10 day of September, 2006, a copy of the foregoing
Judgment and Sentencing Disposition was mailed, postage prepaid, faxed, or sent by interoffice
mail to:

~ Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County

7!i

Deputy Public Defender for Kootenai County
~ Probation & Parole (Fax: 769-1481)
----=-~_<f_Kootenai County Sheriffs Department
7J) Kootenai County Auditor
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p
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
Travis L. BEASLEY, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

raised on postconviction. U.S.e.A. Const.Amend. 6
; I.e. § 19-4901 (a)(I).

121 Criminal Law 110 €=>1881

STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
No. 20419.
July 18, 1994.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 26, 1994.
Applicant filed petition for postconviction relief raising various claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. The District Court of the First Judicial
District, Boundary County, James R. Michaud, l,
denied application, and applicant appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Perry, l, held that: (I) applicant's counsel's failure to file appeal despite applicant's request deprived him of his opportunity to appeal, raising presumption of prejudice from deficient performance; (2) selection of applicant's counsel by public defender who was representing codefendant and compensation fi'om public defender's
contract of funds suggested conflict of interest
which deprived applicant of his right to independent representation; but (3) defendant did not establish that potential conflict of interest impaired conflict counsel's performance.
Vacated in part and affinned in part.
West Headnotes

III Criminal

Law 110 €=>1519(l)

110 Criminal Law
I 10XXX Post-Conviction Relief
11 OXXX(B) Grounds for Relief
II Okl 511 Counsel
llOkl519 Effectiveness of Counsel
II Ok 1519(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly IlOk998(8»
Defendant's claim that he was denied his right
to effective assistance of counsel was properly

I 10 Criminal Law
I 10XXXl Counsel
lIOXXXI(C) Adequacy of Representation
IlOXXX1(C) I In General
11 Ok 1879 Standard of Effective Assistance in General
I 10k 1881 k. Deficient Representation and Prejudice in General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly IlOk641.l3( 1»
To establish violation of constitutional guarantee to effective assistance of counsel, defendant
must show both deficient performance and resulting
prejudice. U.S.e.A. ConsLAmend. 6.

131 Criminal Law 110 ~1519(l)
I 10 Criminal Law
IIOXXX Post-Conviction Relief
110XXX(B) Grounds for Relief
II Okl 511 Counsel
110k 1519 Effectiveness of Counsel
IIOk1519(1) k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly IlOk998(8»
To show that counsel's performance was deficient, applicant for postconviction relief has burden
of showing that his or her attorney's representation
fell below objective standard of reasonableness.
U.S.e.A. Const.Amend. 6.

141 Criminal Law 110 ~1519(3)
110 Criminal Law
110XXX Post-Conviction Relief
II OXXX(B) Grounds for Relief
110k 1511 Counsel
I 10k 1519 Effectiveness of Counsel
I 10k 1519(3) k. Prejudicial Effect.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly IlOk998(8»
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To establish prejudice from defense counsel's
deficient performance, applicant for PQstconviction
relief must show reasonable probability that, but for
his or her attorney's deficient performance, outcome of trial would have been different. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.
151 Criminal Law 110 (;=1519(15)
110 Criminal Law
I 10XXX Post-Conviction Relief
IIOXXX(B) Grounds for Relief
IIOkl511 Counsel
11 Ok 1519 Effectiveness of Counsel
llOkI519(l5) k. Appeal. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 11 Ok998(8»
Applicant was entitled to postconviction relief
based on his counsel's failure to file appeal as requested without having to show prejudice by identifying meritorious issues that were lost as result of
counsel's failure to file
appeal.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.
161 Criminal Law 110(;=1718
110 Criminal Law
I 10XXXI Counsel
lIOXXXI(8) Right of Defendant to Counsel
IIOXXXI(8)2 Stage of Proceedings as
Affecting Right
I 10k 1718 k. Critical Stages. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly I 10k64 1.3(2»

Vi

1.<:.

Page 2

Defendant's right to representation by counsel
extends to all critical stages of his trial, including
appeal. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.
17) Criminal Law 110 ~1870
110 Criminal Law
IIOXXXJ Counsel
I IOXXXI (C) Adequacy of Representation
II OXXXI(C) I In General
II Ok 1870 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly II Ok64 1.13(1
Defendant's right to counsel includes right to
effective
assistance
of
counsel.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.

»

181 Criminal Law 110 ~1967
110 Criminal Law
I J OXXXI Counsel
11 OXXXI(C) Adequacy of Representation
IIOXXXJ(C)2 Particular Cases and Issues
11 Ok 1966 Appeal
11 Ok 1967 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly II Ok 1077.3)
Where criminal defendant advises his or her attorney of desire to appeal, and attorney fails to take
necessary steps to file appeal, defendant has been
denied his or her constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at critical stage in proceedings.
U.S.c.A. Const.Amend. 6.
191 Criminal Law 110 ~1663

Criminal Law 110 ~1741
110 Criminal Law
llOXXXI Counsel
lIOXXXI(8) Right of Defendant to Counsel
1IOXXXI(8)2 Stage of Proceedings as
Affecting Right
11 Ok 1741 k. Appeal or Certiorari; Further Appeal; Proceedings on Remand. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly I 1Ok64 1.3(2), I lOki 077.3)

110 Criminal Law
II OXXX Post-Conviction Relief
11 OXXX(C) Proceedings
IIOXXX(C)3 Hearing and Determination
11 Ok1662 Disposition
I 10k 1663 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly llOk998(l8»
On postconviction, applicant alleging denial of
appeal because his lawyer did not file appeal as re-
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quested would be restored to status enjoyed immediately following judgment of conv.iction when he
was entitled to direct appeal; applicant should not
be required to identity meritorious issues that
would have been raised on appeal, since this would
amount to additional hurdle to clear just because his
rights were violated at some earlier stage in proceedings.

1101 Criminal Law ItO €==1967
1 10 Crim inal Law
IIOXXXI Counsel
IIOXXXI(C) Adequacy of Representation
II OXXXI(C)2 Particular Cases and Issues
11 Okl966 Appeal
I 10k 1967 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 1 I Ok64 I. 13(7)
Loss of opportunity to appeal is itself sufficient
prejudice to support claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel based on failure to appeal as requested
by criminal defendant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

Iltl

Criminal Law 110 €==1803

110 Criminal Law
I 10XXXI Counsel
IIOXXXI(8) Right of Defendant to Counsel
IIOXXXI(B)7 Joint Representation of
Codefendants
II Ok 1803 k. Partners and Associates;
Public Defenders. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 11Ok641.5(6»)
Selection of defense counsel by public defender who represented codefendant who eventually
testified as a prosecution witness suggested conflict
of interest which deprived defendant of his right to
independent representation; because conflicts counsel was selected by public defender and compensated from the public defender's contract funds,
there was legitimate concern that conflicts counsel
may be influenced by personal, economic interest
in future conflicts representation, that may be contrary to interest of his client and temper his advocacy on behalf of his client. U.S.C.A.

Const.Amend. 6.

1121 Criminal Law 110 ~1800
110 Criminal Law
I 10XXXI Counsel
11 OXXXI(B) Right of Defendant to Counsel
IIOXXXI(8)7 Joint Representation of
Codefendants
11 Ok 1800 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly llOk641.5(.5)
Determination of whether attomey representing
defendant engaged in multiple representation IS
mixed question of law and fact.

1131 Criminal Law ItO

~1800

110 Criminal Law
IIOXXXI Counsel
11 OXXXI(B) Right of Defendant to Counsel
lIOXXXI(B)7 Joint Representation of
Codefendants
11 Ok 1800 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly l1Ok641.5(.5)
Multiple representation per se does not violate
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel,
unless it gives rise to conflict of interest. U .S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 6.

114J Criminal Law 110 ~1790
110 Criminal Law
110XXXI Counsel
11 OXXXI(B) Right of Defendant to Counsel
IIOXXXI(8)6 Conflict of Interest
II Ok 1790 k. Advice, Inquiry, and Determination. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 11 Ok641.5(.5)
Defense counsel has ethical obligation to avoid
conflicting representations and to advise court
promptly when conflict of interest arises during
course of trial.

1151 O·iminal Law 110 ~1781
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110 Criminal Law
IIOXXXI Counsel
IIOXXXI(B) Right of Defendant to Counsel
11 OXXXI(B)6 Conflict oflnterest
II Ok 1781 k. Prejudice and Harm III
General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly I IOk64 1.5(.5))
When defense counsel is burdened by actual
conflict of interest, counsel breaches duty of loyalty
to cI ient.

J 01 1L.

Cases
(Formerly I lOk641. 13(2. I »
Defendant did not establish that his counsel
rendered- ineffective assistance by failing to advise
him not to give statement to police, where counsel
testified that he normally advised his clients not to
make statements to police, and defendant failed to
present any evidence on advise counsel had given
him regarding statement. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6 .

**716*358 James H. Paulsen. Sandpoint, for appel1161 Criminal Law 110 ~1783
110 Criminal Law
IIOXXXI Counsel
IIOXXXI(B) Right of Defendant to Counsel
IIOXXXI(B)6 Conflict oflnterest
II Ok 1782 Particular Cases or Situations
11 Ok 1783 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 1 IOk64 1.5(.5»
Defendant did not establish prejudice from potential conflict of interest by conflict attorney stemming f)'om method used for his selection and compensation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6.

1171 Criminal Law 110 ~1780
110 Criminal Law
I 10XXXI Counsel
II OXXXI(B) Right of Defendant to Counsel
IIOXXXI(B)6 Conflict oflnterest
IlOkl780 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly I lOk64 1.5(.5»
Possibility of conflict of interest is insufficient
to impugn criminal conviction.

1181 Criminal Law 110 ~1890
110 Criminal Law
I I OXXXI Counsel
II OXXXI(C) Adequacy of Representation
IIOXXXI(C)2 Particular Cases and Issues
II Ok 1890 k. In General. Most Cited

lant.
Lan), EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., Thomas P. Watkins,
Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Boise, for respondent.

PERR Y, Judge.
In this appeal, Travis Beasley challenges the
district court's denial of his post-conviction application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in
two related cases. After conducting a hearing on his
application, the district court ruled that Beasley had
not satisfied his burden of establishing a violation
of his constitutional right to the effective assistance
of counsel with regard to any of the claims alleged
in his application. We affirm in part, vacate in part,
and remand.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 1990, Beasley was initially questioned as part of a police investigation into a breakin at the Mountain Springs Laundromat in Bonners
Ferry, Idaho. He was charged with one count of
burglary and one count of grand theft. In exchange
for an agreement with the state not to oppose his request for release, Beasley gave a statement to the
police. As a result of the statement, which implicated him in another crime, Beasley was charged in
connection with burglaries at Trygg Chain in Bonners Ferry. The magistrate subsequently denied
Beasley's request to be released on his own recognizance.
When Beasley was first arrested in the Moun-
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FN I. Attorney Elliott and attorney Dan
Featherston, who maintained separate offices, joined in a contract to provide public
defender services in Boundary County
between October 1988 and October 1990.
As of October 1, 1990, however, Featherston individually contracted as the public
defender.
At the hearing on the motion to continue, Elliott advised that he could no longer represent Beasley because he would be leaving his law practice to
become a magistrate. Ell iott further informed the
district court that Featherston, the current Boundary
County public defender, represented one of Beasley's co-defendants which created a conflict of interest precluding Featherston from representing
Beasley in the Mountain Springs case.
The district court ordered that new counsel be
appointed to represent Beasley and continued the
trial in the Mountain Springs case. Pursuant to the
public defender contract, Featherston hired a
private attorney as substitute conflicts counsel for
Beasley. A notice of substitution of counsel, signed
by Elliott, Featherston and Roger Hanlon, the new
conflicts counsel, was filed with the district court in
both cases on December 18, 1990.

or
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tain Springs case in October 1990, he contacted
Gary Elliott, a public defender with whom he had
prior dealings. Attorney Elliott, however, was no
longer under contract as public defender for Boundary County, the contract having expired October I,
1990. FNJ At his mTaignment in each case, counsel
was appointed to represent Beasley in the district
COUIt. Elliott undertook Beasley's representation
and acted as his counsel through the December 9,
1990, hearing on a motion to continue the trial date
in the Mountain Springs case. Attorneys Featherston and Elliott testified at the post-conviction hearing that Elliott's efforts on behalf of Beasley were
provided in his capacity as a conflicts attorney
hired by Featherston.

0

guilty of burglary and grand theft in the Mountain
Springs Laundromat case. In the Trygg Chain case,
Beasley entered a plea of guilty to two counts of
first degree burglary and the remaining three counts
against him were dismissed. The cases were consolidated for sentencing, at which time Beasley received concurrent sentences of three to ten years.
The judgment of conviction was entered on March
18,1991.
On May 22, 1991, Beasley filed an appl ication
for post-conviction relief, raising various claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel. He pointed to attorney Elliott's alleged failure to advise him against
giving the statement to the police that led to the
charges in the Trygg Chain case. Beasley also pointed to attorney Han lon's allegedly deficient performance**717 *359 at trial in the Mountain
Springs case. Beasley specifically alleged that Hanlon failed to move to suppress his statement to the
police, failed to adequately investigate the case,
failed to meet with Beasley until the day of trial,
and failed to file an appeal from the judgment of
conviction. Beasley also contended that a conflict
of interest arose.out of the public defender's representation of Beasley and his co-defendant, which
denied him the effective assistance of counsel due
him under the Constitution.
Beasley and the three attorneys involved in his
representation testified at the hearing on his postconviction application. Following the hearing, the
district court denied relief and dismissed the application, concluding that Beasley had failed on each of
his claims to show deficient performance by counsel or prejudice to Beasley sufficient to satisfy the
two-pronged standard for ineffective assistance derived from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S.Ct. 2052,80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). On the conflict of interest claim and counsel's failure to directly appeal, the district court found that Beasley
had requested an appeal that counsel inexplicably
did not file. The district court, citing Russell v.
Slule, 118 Idaho 65, 794 P.2d 654 (Ct.App.1990),
said that Beasley must:

Following a two-day trial, a jury found Beasley
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at a minimum demonstrate there were issues that
could have been raised on direct appeal and that
those issues will not be resolved on their merits
as a result of this post-conviction proceeding.
Because Beasley failed to specify direct appeal
issues in his post-conviction application, supported
by proof at the hearing, the district court concluded
that Beasley had not shown prejudice and therefore,
was not entitled to relief. Beasley appealed.
ANALYSIS
[I] The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act, I.e. §§ 19-490 I to 19-4911, is available to
show that the conviction was in violation of constitutional rights. I.e. § 19-4901 (a)( I). Beasley's
claim that he was denied his Sixth Amendment
right to the effective assistance of counsel, therefore, is properly raised on post-conviction. See Parroll v. Slate, 117 Idaho 272, 787 P.2d 258 (1990);
Nellsch v. Slale, 122 Idaho 426, 835 P.2d 661
(Ct.App.1992).
[2][3][4] In order to establish a violation of the
constitutional guarantee to effective assistance of
counsel, the defendant must show both deficient
performance and resulting prejudice. Gibson v.
State, 110 Idaho 631, 634-35,718 P.2d 283,286-87
(1986), citing Strickland. supra. To show that counsel's performance was deficient, the applicant for
post-conviction relief has the burden of showing
that his or her attorney's representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon \'.
Siale, 114 Idaho 758, 760 P.2d 1174 (1988). To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for his or her attorney's
deficient performance, the outcome of the trial
would have been different. Id
I. COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO FILE A DIRECT
APPEAL
[5] In his application, Beasley asserts that his
counsel's conduct in not filing a direct appeal upon
his request was deficient performance under Flores
v. State,
104 Idaho 191, 657 P.2d 488
(Ct.App.1983), and State v. Dillard, 110 Idaho 834,

01 1.L.
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718 P.2d 1272 (Ct.App.1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 887. 107 S.Ct. 283, 93 L.Ed.2d 258 (1986),
where the COUli did not require that prejudice be
shown before affording the applicant postconviction relief. Accordingly, Beasley argues that
the district court erred in requiring him to identifY
the meritorious issues which were lost as a result of
the lack of a direct appeal pursuant to Russell 1'.
Stale, 118 Idaho 65, 794 P.2d 654 (Ct.App.1990).
Beasley contends that Russell, supra, is superseded
by subsequent United States Supreme Court authority which holds that it is prejudice per se when a
criminal defendant requests that an appeal be filed
and his counsel fails to comply with this request.
See Lo:::ada v. Deed~. 498 U.S. 430, 111 S.Ct. 860,
112 L.Ed.2d 956 (\991). We agree.
[6][7][8] A defendant's right to representation
by counsel extends to all critical stages of his trial,
including appeal. Flores, supra, 104 Idaho at 194,
657 P.2d at 491. citing **718*360Douglas v. California. 372 U.S. 353. 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811
(1963). This right to counsel includes the right to
effective assistance of counsel. State v. Clayton,
100 Idaho 896, 897, 606 P.2d 1000, 1001 (1980).
Where a criminal defendant advises his or her attorney of a desire to appeal, and the attorney fails to
take the necessary steps to file an appeal, such a defendant has been denied his or her constitutional
right to the effective assistance of counsel at a critical stage in the proceedings. Flores, SlIpra, 104
Idaho at 194-95, 657 P.2d at 491-92.
Beasley's case is distinguishable from Flores,
supra, where the appellate court remanded to the
district court for a factual finding as to whether the
defendant had made known to counsel his desire to
appeal. Compare also Sanders v. Slate, I J 7 Idaho
939, 792 P.2d 964 (Ct.App. I 990) (trial court's finding in post-conviction proceeding that petitioner
had failed to communicate to his attorney his desire
to appeal, based upon evidence presented, was not
clearly erroneous). It is undisputed here that Beasley advised his trial counsel of his wish to appeal
his conviction. The record also clearly shows that
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trial counsel, and the public defender who assumed
Beasley's representation after the entry of his judgment of conviction, understood that Beasley desired
to appeal. FN2 Therefore. a remand in this case for
that factual finding is unnecessary.
FN2. Attomey Hanlon testified that his
representation of Beasley ended once the
judgment of conviction was entered and
after he had conveyed to Featherston that
Beasley wanted to appeal. Attomey Featherston testified that he was advised of
Beasley's desire to appeal, but upon review
of the file he determined that a postconvictIOn proceeding, not an appeal,
would be the best course of action. He discussed this with Beasley in various meetings with Beasley at the jail. However,
their communications broke down due to a
deteriorating relationsh ip. Featherston testified that he did not file a notice of appeal
on Beasley's behalf as requested within
forty-two days from entry of the judgment
of conviction.
Unlike Flores and Sanders, which dealt only
with the deficient performance prong of the defendant's ineffective assistance claim, Russell addressed
the issue of prejudice from counsel's failure to file
an appeal. The Court of Appeals explained therein,
that because Russell had failed to show prejudice
by not identitying what meritorious issues were lost
as a result of the lack of a direct appeal, he was not
entitled to post-conviction relief. Russell, supra,
118 Idaho at 69, 794 P.2d at 659. FN3 Russel/,
however, is distinguishable from the instant matter.
In his post-conviction application, Russell chose to
raise not only his claims of ineffective assistance,
which are proper issues for post-conviction, but
also his challenges to the voluntariness of his guilty
plea, which were his direct appeal issues. Rather
than allow the direct appeal that had been previously denied to Russell, the Court properly resolved
all of the issues that were before it. Having resolved
those issues, the Court concluded that Russell had

0 VI 1":'

not raised any other issue for consideration in a dir~
ect appeal from his convictions and, consequently,
had not shown prejudice from lack of the appeal.
Here, we conclude that the language in Russell,
which requires a showing of prejudice when ineffectiveness of counsel is attributed to counsel's failure to file an appeal, was dicta and is not controlling under the facts in Beasley's case.
FN3. The failure to appeal issue as a basis
for Russell's ineffective assistance claim
was not raised in the district court. The
reasoning of the Court in Russel/, however,
was consistent with the Court of Appeals'
comment in Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho
939. 941 n. 2, 792 P.2d 964, 966 n. 2
(Ct.App. I 990), which we now criticize.
The footnote indicated that Sanders would
have to show the meritorious nature of any
appeal by identitying the issues he would
have raised on appeal, although this Court
expressly stated it would "intimate no view
that any such appeal would have been meritorious."

Dillard, supra, is also cited by Beasley as authority for the granting of post-conviction relief on
an ineffective assistance claim based on failure to
file an appeal without regard to the probability of
success on appeal. In the appeal from Dillard's
judgment of conviction, the Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of the delayed appeal FN4 as
relief in the post*361 -**719 conviction proceedings alleging ineffectiveness of counsel for failure
to perfect an appeal. Dillard, supra, 110 Idaho at
846, 718 P.2d at 1284. Ruling on the postconviction application, the district court granted relief after finding that Dillard had requested his
counsel to file an appeal, although no appeal was
filed, and without requiring a further showing of
prejudice suffered by the lack of an appeal.
However, the Court of Appeals was not requested
to, nor did it directly address the question of whether prejudice may be presumed when counsel's failure to file an appeal is deemed to be ineffective per-
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formance. We decline to rely solely on Dillard as
precedent with regard to whether a post-conviction
applicant must show prejudice from counsel's failure to file an appeal as requested.
FN4. In Dillard, the district court's order
granting post-conviction relief in the form
of a delayed appeal was not appealed by
the state. The state's brief in the delayed
appeal began by claiming that the appeal
was jurisdictionally defective. The Court
of Appeals held, however, that the delayed
appeal was not jurisdictionally defective
and considered the issues raised by Dillard
attacking his conviction. Dillard. supra,
110 Idaho at 838,718 P.2d at 1276.
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court criticized the Ninth Circuit's decision requiring a federal habeas corpus petitioner "to show more than a
simple deprivation of this right [to an appeal] before relief can be accorded [and requiring] him to
show some likelihood of success on appea\."
Rodrique:: v. Uniled Stales, 395 U.S. 327, 330, 89
S.Ct. 1715, 1717,23 L.Ed.2d 340 (1969). The Supreme Court held that the courts below had erred in
rejecting petitioner's relief because of his failure to
specifY the points he would raise were his right to
appeal reinstated. Id Following Rodriquez,
a number of federal and state courts have held
that when it is clear that a petitioner wished to
pursue an appeal, but the appeal was either not
timely perfected or was dismissed for failure to
file an appellate brief, then the petitioner has
suffered prejudice per se, and the appeal may be
reinstated without a showing that the issues
which «ould have been raised on appeal had a
reasonable probability of success.

Matter of Frampton, 45 Wash.App. 554, 726
P.2d 486, 489 ( 1986) (citations omitted). See a/so
Abels v. Kaiser, 913 F.2d 821 (10th Cir.1990)
(prejudice presumed from failure to file appeal, relying on Rodriquez, supra ); Estes v. United States,
883 F.2d 645 (8th Cir.1989) (prejudice presumed

':1 Ul lL.
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from failure to file appeal, relying on pre-Strickland
cases for standard of ineffective assistance requiring deficient performance and resulting prejudice).
Although Rodriquez arose from a prosecution in the
federal court, more recently in a prosecution by the
state of Nevada, the United States Supreme Court
recognized a presumption of prejudice where counsel failed to perfect a criminal defendant's appeal.
See Lozada v. Deeds, 498 U.S. 430. 432, I II S.C!.
860,861, 112 L.Ed.2d 956 (1991).
[9] The rationale offered by these courts is
sound. A defendant denied an appeal because his
lawyer did not file an appeal as requested should
not be given an additional hurdle to clear just because his rights were violated at some earlier stage
in the proceedings. See Rodriquez, supra, 395 U.S.
at 330, 89 S.C!. at 1717. On post-conviction then,
the defendant should not be required to identify the
meritorious issues that would have been raised, but
should be restored to the status enjoyed immediately following the judgment of conviction when
the defendant was entitled to a direct appea\.
In addition, it has been said that a defendant
whose counsel failed to file an appeal as requested
has been deprived, not of the effective assistance of
counsel, but of any assistance of counsel on appea\.
Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717 (7th
Clr.1994). Counsel's failure to perfect an appeal
"essentially waivers] respondent's opportunity to
make a case on the merits; in this sense it is difficult to distinguish respondent's situation from that
of someone with no counsel at all." Evitts v. LUCL,,)',
469 U.S. 387, 394 n. 6. 105 S.C!. 830, 835 n. 6, 83
L.Ed.2d 821 (1985).
The United States Supreme Court has also held
that the prejudice component of Strickland does not
apply when an appellate lawyer fails either to file
an appeal brief or to satisfy the requirements of Anders v. Ca/tromia, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.C!. 1396, 18
L.Ed.2d 493 (1967) F~5 in seeking leave to withdraw during an appeal. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S.
75, 109 S.Ct. 346, 102 L.Ed.2d 300*362 **720
(1988). Since Penson, every court that has squarely

© 2011 111Omson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

094
http://web2.westlaw.com/print/printstrearn.aspx?sv=Split&prft=HTMLE&fl1=_ top&rnt=39 .,. 4/21/2011

rage::

883 P.2d 714
126 Idaho 356, 883 P.2d 714
(Cite as: 126 Idaho 356, 883 P.2d 714)
confronted the question with regard to the need to
prove prejudice has held that failure to take an appeal, despite the defendant's request, is ineffective
assistance without regard to the probability of success on appeal. Castellanos, supra, 26 F.3d at 718,
citing Bonneau v. United S'lates, 961 F.2d 17 (1st
Cir.1992); j,Jiilfiams v. Lockhart, 849 F.2d 1134,
1137 n. 3 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. Horodner, 993 F.2d 191, 195 (9th Cir.1993); United
States 1'. Davis, 929 F.2d 554, 557 (10th Cir.199l).
FN5. Anders allows appointed counsel to
withdraw from a first appeal as of right on
the basis that the appeal is frivolous.
[10] Adopting this reasoning, we adhere, therefore, to our recent opinion in Mala v. State. 124
Idaho 588, 861 P.2d 1253 (Ct.App.1993), where we
stated that the prejudice suffered by Mata, who
claimed that his counsel did not file an appeal as requested, was the loss of the opportunity to appeal.
That loss is itself sufficient prejudice to support a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on
a failure to appeal as requested by a criminal defendant. Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 898, 865
P.2d 985, 989 (Ct.App.1993). Having determined
that Beasley's counsel either neglected or refused to
file an appeal despite Beasley's request, we conclude that ineffective assistance of counsel deprived
Beasley of his opportunity to appeal and that prejudice is presumed from this deficient performance.
Accordingly, we hold that the district court incorrectly required Beasley to establish prejudice in
its denial of his post-conviction application. The
judgment of conviction must be vacated and
reentered so that Beasley may perfect a timely appeal. See Mala, supra.
2. CONFLICTS ISSUE
[I I] Beasley also alleges that a conflict of interest arose when the public defender's office represented both his interests and those of a codefendant who eventually testified as a prosecution
witness at Beasley's trial in the Mountain Springs
case. Beasley's argument is premised on the belief

iV Vi
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that his representation was or could have been in
some way directed by the public defender. Even
though a conflicts attorney was employed to replace
the public defender initially appointed in Beasley's
case, Beasley asserts that the conflict persisted because it was the public defender who selected, hired
and paid the conflicts attorneys. Beasley claims
that, as a result of the conflict of interest, he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
[12][13] The determination of whether an attorney representing the defendant engaged in multiple
representation is a mixed question of law and fact.
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 342, 100 S.Ct.
1708, 1714, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Multiple representation per se, however, does not violate the
Sixth Amendment unless it gives rise to a conflict
of interest. Holloway v. Arkansas. 435 U.S. 475,
482,98 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978).
[14][15] Defense counsel has an ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to advise the court promptly when a conflict of interest
arises during the course of trial. See Cuyler, supra,
446 U.S. at 346, n. 11,100 S.Ct. at 1717, n. II. citing ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, DR
5-105, EC 5-15 (1976); ABA Project on Standards
for Criminal Justice, Defense Function § 3.5(b)
(App Draft 1971). When counsel is burdened by an
actual conflict of interest, counsel breaches the duty
of loyalty, the most basic of counsel's duties to his
or her client. See Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at
692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067.
In order to establish a violation of the Sixth
Amendment-forming the basis of an ineffective assistance claim-a defendant who raised no objection
at trial must demonstrate not only that an actual
conflict of interest existed, but also that the conflict
adversely affected the lawyer's performance.
Cuyler, supra, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. at 1719;
M~'Neeley v. State, III Idaho 200, 202, 722 P.2d
1067, 1069 (CLApp.1986). Only upon a showing of
such adverse effect is the prejudice from counsel's
error presumed. Strickland. supra, 466 U.S. at 692,
104 S.Ct. at 2067, citing Cuyler, supra.
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It would have been preferable for the district
court to have examined Beasley's allegations of
conflict of interest at the various stages of the proceedings in this case. Although the district court
made no finding as to whether a conflict existed,
we are not bound to order a reversal where the record is clear and yields an obvious answer to the
relevant question. Davis v. Stale, I 16 Idaho 401,
775 P.2d 1243 (Ct.App.1989).

Upon ollr review of the record, we find that
Beasley's assertion that his counsel had been selected by the public defender and compensated from
the public defender's contract funds suggests a contlict of interest which deprived him of his right to
independent representation. Beasley makes a compelling argument against allowing the public defender to, in essence, pick his opponent by personally selecting contlicts counsel. Because of this selection process and method of payment, there is
also a legitimate concern that conflicts counsel may
be influenced by a personal, economic interest in
future conflicts representation, which interest may
be contrary to the interests of his client and lead
counsel into tempering his advocacy on behalf of
his client.
[16][ 17) Wh ile the contractual arrangement described here presents a potential conflict of interest,
in order to prevail Beasley must not only show a
conflict but that the conflict impaired counsel's performance. We conclude, however, that Beasley has
not shown any deficiency in his counsel's performance stemming from the methodology used to select
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In ruling on Beasley's application for postconviction relief, the district court did not analyze
Beasley's claims of ineffective assistance based on
a conflict of interest separately from his allegation
of counsel's failure to **721 *363 file an appea\.
The district court only considered the alleged contlict of interest as a possible explanation for counsel's failure to appeal Beasley's conviction. The district court then determined that Beasley had failed
to show he was prejudiced as a result of his counsel's failure to file the appea\.

at;\"

and compensate the conflict attorney. The possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal
conviction. Cuyler, supra, 446 U.S. at 350, 100
S.Ct. at 1719.
We conclude that the only showing of prejudice made by Beasley was that which stemmed
from counsel's failure to file the appeal which Beasley had requested. We affirm the district court's
denial of post-conviction relief on Beasley's claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel founded on his
contlict of interest allegations.
3. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
The balance of Beasley's claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel can be disposed of in <r summary fashion. We have reviewed the district court's
determination that Beasley failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that his trial counsel's performance was deficient when he did not file
a motion to suppress Beasley's statement and did
not meet with Beasley until the day of trial. We affirm the decision ofthe district court.
[18] Finally, we review the district court's determination that Beasley did not meet his burden of
proof with regard to his claim that his counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise
him not to give a statement to the police. The district court considered the testimony of counsel, indicating that he normally advised his clients not to
make statements to the police. Beasley failed to
present any evidence as to the advice counsel had
given him regarding giving a statement, and the district court held counsel's conduct not to be deficient. In view of the absence of evidence of deficient perfonnance, an essential element of the claim
of ineffective assistance, the district court's denial
of post-conviction reliefis affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The record herein demonstrates a factual basis
for post-conviction relief on the ineffectiveness
claim based on counsel's failure to appea\. The determination of whether an appeal should be taken or
not rests solely with the accused and is not to be de-
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cided by his attorney. Gardner v. State. 91 Idaho
909,912,435 P.2d 249, 251 (1967). Under the facts
in this case, counsel did not act to adequately protect Beasley's right to appeal. The judgment of conviction must be vacated and reentered to allow
Beasley to seek review through a delayed appeal.
All matters resolved in this opinion shall be res judicata on any such appeal. As to all other claims,
**722 *364 the district court's denial of postconviction relief is affirmed.
WALTERS, C.J., and LANSING, 1., concur.
Idaho App., 1994.
Beasley v. State
126 Idaho 356,883 P.2d 714
END OF DOCUMENT
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

KIRK GOSCH,
Petitioner,
vs.

CASE NO. CV-2007-5443
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
COMPEL COUNSEL TO SPEAK

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

On April 21, 2011, in open court and on the record, this Court indicated its intent to sign
an order upon presentment requiring Ann Taylor and Mark Durant to speak to Petitioner and
Respondent with regard to the allegations set forth in Petitioner's Amended Petition for PostConviction Relief. This motion was made orally by Respondent, without prior notice to
Petitioner, and without the accompaniment of any recitation of authority.
Based upon further consideration, it is incumbent upon the Court to deny Respondent's
motion. Post-conviction matters are civil in nature, and thus are governed by the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, _ , 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (July 27, 2010)
(quoting DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601, 200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009)) (other citations
omitted). Therefore, the discovery rules set forth in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure are
applicable and binding herein. The Respondent has failed to provide the Court with an indication
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL
1
COUNSEL TO SPEAK

09J

that it has availed itself of the procedures and remedies set forth in the Rules of Civil Procedure,
in order to permit this Court to compel Ann Taylor or Mark Durant to Speak.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent's motion to require Ann Taylor and Mark
Durant to speak to Petitioner and Respondent is denied.

Dated this

~ay of April, 2011.
udge

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO COMPEL
COUNSEL TO SPEAK

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~c.J.. day of April, 2011, I caused, to be served, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document as addressed to:
Ann Taylor
Kootenai County Public Defender's Office
Fax: (208) 446-1701
Art Verharen
5431 N. GO"leffl1nenl Way Ste lOlA
CQ8l:l:f d'Alene, ID 83816
Fax: (208) 967 7666 Wlo-l¥~ '3
Mark Durant
Investigator, Kootenai County Public Defender's Office
Fax: (208) 446-1701
Sean Walsh
Walsh Law Office, PLLC
206 Indiana St., Ste, 117
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Fax: (208) 765-4636
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
Fax: (208)446-1833
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Deputy Clerk
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COUNSEL TO SPEAK
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

KIRK GOSCH, ,
CASE NO. CV 2007·5443
Petitioner,
RESPONDENT'S
. . TRIAL BRmF

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

COMES NOW, RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO. by and through ArthurVerharen,
Deputy Prosecuting Attomey for Kootenai County. and hereby submits Respondent's Trial
Brief

AP.PLICABLE LAW
In the context of ineffective asSistance of co~el claims. an applicant must satisfy two

e;eparate tests. Roman 'Y. State, 125 Idaho 644, 649 (Ct. App. 1994). The first issue centers on
whether, utilizing an objective standard, applicant's counsel fell short of competence standards.

ld. In making this determination, "there is a strong presumption that counsel's perfOIID,aIlce falls

within the wiae range of competent professional assistance.·s Id. 'IIi evaluating that perfomiance.
"a court must endeavor 'to eliminate the distorting effects of lrlndsight, to reconstru.<?t the

RESPONDENT'S TRIAL BRmF':' 1

KO C0 PROSECUTER

20 Il1Hk. 'nIFR I 16: 42

FAX No,

lU~-44

p, UU:UUU4

circumstances of counsel's challenged condl:lCt,' and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's
perSpective at the time." Milburn v. State, 135 Idaho 701, 706 (Ct. App. 2000) quoting
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
The second step in successfully asserti.D.g an ineffective assistmce of counsel claim is·that

the applicant "must show·there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional
l

errors, the results of the proceeding would have been different." Roman, 125 Idaho at 649. In '
, other words, the applicant must present sufficient evidence that due to counsel's failure to
provide competent representation, applicant was somehow "prejudiced" ld. In summary, a
,

'

post-conviction "applicant must show actual unreason4ble performance by mal counsel and

actual prejudice~" ,Milburn, 135 Idaho at 706.

ARGUMENT
The principal issue in our case is whether Anne Taylor told Petitione~ that nhe filed an
appeal the state could retry the cocaine trafficking count. That issue will remain unanswered
until Ms. Taylor is called as a wi1ness in this matter and compelled to testify.

CONCLUSION

In the event the Court finds that Anne Taylor's professional assistance to ,Petitioner was
not ineffective and that Petitioner suffered no prejudice, Re~pondent requests the, Court dismiss
the Amended Petition.

DATED this

1.:2-

day of April, 2011.

~JuV\\~VL

ARTHUR VERHAREN
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
·CERTIFICATE-OF MAII.;ING

I hereby certi:fy that on 'tQe

'Z2-

day of April, 2011, a true and .correct copy ofthe
furegoiDg was caused to be FAXED to SEAN WALSH.
~
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BARRY McHUGH
Prosecuting Attorney
.
501 Government WayfBox 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8.3814
Telephone: (208) 446N1800
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST ruDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN
, AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI.
.
KIRK GOSCH,
CASE NO. CV 2007·5443
. 'Petitioner,
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

VS.

STATE OF ·IDAHO,
Respondent.

The above matter came on for hearing before Judge Simpson on_~.. The Petitioner and his

attorney were present as was an attomey for Respondent.
FINDINGS OF FACT
.1. Defendant's 1rial counsel, Anne Taylor, (did - did not) communicate 10 Petitioner that the
state could -recharge him with "the cocaine count if he filed an.appeal.
2. Defendant dId not :tile an appeal because _ _ _.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. (proposed. conclusions of law will be forwarded when Respondent is able determine what
the facts will be).
1·"..·· .,

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF' FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW-1

: \,)

20111APRILUHJ lo:4J

. KU C( 1

u~U:::;t:CUTt:~

y, UU4/UU4

ORDER: Based on the· Findings of Fact and ConclusIons of Law;

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Post Conviction Reliefbe _ _

DATED this _ _ _ day of ApriL 2011
District Judge

.
·CERmJCATE OF MAILING
.
1 hereby ~ertify that on the £::..2- day of April. 2011, a trUe and correct copy of the
'foregoing was caused to be FAXED to SEAN WAL~
~

VuJi.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

KIRK GOSCH,
Petitioner,
vs.

CASE NO. CV -2007-5443
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

The above matter came on for hearing before Judge Simpson on May 3, 2011. The
Petitioner participated telephonically and his attorney was present, as was attorney for
Respondent.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The only time Petitioner expressed his desire to "appeal everything" was walking to the
Public Defender's Office, with his attorneys, immediately after the verdict had been taken
in CR-F05-403.
2. This expression of his desire to "appeal everything" occurred prior to sentencing, and
prior to judgment.
3. This statement was made during a time of stress and confusion for the Petitioner, as he
had learned of his verdict just prior to making this statement.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1

4. Upon expressing a desire to "appeal everything", Petitioner was directed by his attorneys
to contact them the next day by scheduling an appointment.
5. Petitioner was instructed to contact his counsel the next day because his attorneys
believed Petitioner was in a confused and stressful state due to the recent verdict.
Therefore, waiting a day would allow Petitioner to digest the verdict, and more clearly
articulate what exactly he wanted to appeal.
6. After the verdict Petitioner never scheduled an appointment, nor spoke with his attorneys
in regards to an appeal.
7. The Public Defender's Office made several attempts to contact Petitioner following his
request to "appeal everything".
8. These attempts included an attempt to make available to Petitioner the services of the
Public Defender's Investigator, prior to Petitioner's sentencing.
9. Despite numerous attempts to contact Petitioner, however, the Public Defender's Office
was unsuccessful in its attempts to reach him.
10. At his sentencing, Petitioner was notified, in writing, of his right to appeal.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. A post-conviction applicant has the burden of proving the grounds upon which he seeks
relief. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990), citing
I.C.R.57(c).
2. A criminal defendant's right to counsel includes the right to representation on appeal.

Mala v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 592, 861 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Ct. App. 1993) (citations
omitted). If a defendant asks his attorney to appeal, and an attorney thereafter refuses to
do so, the defendant is deprived of effective assistance of counsel. ld. at 593, 861 P.2d at
1258 (citations omitted).
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

3. In post-conviction proceedings, a petitioner need not identify the meritorious issues that
would have been raised, had an appeal been filed, in order to made a proper showing of
ineffective assistance. Beasleyv. State, 126 Idaho 356, 361, 883 P.2d 714, 719 (1994).
Rather, a defendant who proves that he was denied an appeal because his lawyer did not
file an appeal as requested, states a meritorious claim for ineffective assistance without
regard to the probability of success on appeal. Id. In other words, the loss of the right to
appeal is sufficient prejudice, in and of itself, to support a claim of ineffective assistance.

Id. at 362, 883 P.2d at 720.
4. Beasley and the current matter before this Court are distinguishable, because Beasley
requested an appeal of his conviction, and the record clearly showed that trial counsel,
and the public defender who assumed representation of Beasley after entry of his
judgment of conviction, understood that Beasley desired to appeal. Id. at 360, 883 P .2d
at 718.
5. Other cases in Idaho are similarly distinguishable. In Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 191,657
P .2d 488 (Ct. App. 1983), the Petitioner claimed that he requested an appeal multiple
times, and that his attorney ignored this request. The court held that "[i]fFlores'
allegations were true and if the attorney's inaction caused Flores not to appeal, he would
be entitled to relief." Id. at 195, 657 P.2d at 492. Therefore, the appellate court held that a
material issue offact existed, and therefore the district court's order of dismissal was
vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing as to that issue. Id.
6. In State v. Dillard, 110 Idaho 834, 718 P.2d 1272 (et. App. 1986), the court recognized
the holding in Flores, including the fact that "if Flores' allegations were true and if the
attorney's inaction caused Flores not to appeal, he would be entitled to relief on his postconviction petition." Dillard, 110 Idaho at 838, 718 P.2d at 1276 (emphasis added).
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Additionally, Dillard recognized that the pertinent questions were "whether an appeal
had been filed and, if not, whether Dillard's attorney was atfault in notjiling an appeal."

ld. (Emphasis added). The Dillard matter also explained that a letter from Dillard's trial
counsel, which was dated twelve days after the judgment of conviction, recognized that
Dillard wished to seek an appeal, and that an appeal would be filed shortly. ld.
7. In Sanders, supra, the Court held:
It is also well settled that where state law allows for direct appeal of a criminal
conviction, a defendant has a right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.
The determination of whether an appeal should be taken rests solely with the
defendant. His counsel has no duty to prosecute an appeal in the absence of an
affirmative request from the defendant. Where a criminal defendant advises his
attorney of his desire to appeal, and the attorney fails to take the necessary steps
to file the appeal, the defendant has a basis for a claim that he has been denied the
right to effective assistance of counsel. However, it is implicit in this rule of law
that the desire to appeal must have been communicated to counselor otherwise
understood by him.

ld. at 940, 796 P.2d at 965 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Sanders alleged
that, at the conclusion of his sentencing hearing, he turned to his attorney and said,
"appeal this." ld. at 941, 796 P.2d at 966. Counsel did not recall whether Sanders made
such a statement or not. ld. at 940, 796 P.2d at 966. The district court rejected Sanders'
claim, and held:
[t]here is simply no showing that the attorney's representation of Sanders was
deficient with respect to his failure to file [an appeal]. ... Even accepting
petitioner's testimony that he said "appeal this" to the attorney at the conclusion
of the sentencing hearing, it is clear that in the commotion of the termination of
proceedings that day and Mr. Sander's haste to turn from counsel table to the
family of the murder victim to extend his apology, whatever communication he
made to the attorney simply was not heard by him, if in fact, that statement was
made at all. Counsel cannot be held to execute on a client's request when the
request is not fully and fairly communicated to counsel. Furthermore, throughout
all of the contacts petitioner had with the Office of the Public Defender ... Mr.
Sanders never expressed to anyone in that office his wish to prosecute a direct
appeal of the sentence. Mr. Sanders never inquired about the progress of such an
appeal.

ld. (Emphasis added). The appellate court affirmed the trial court. ld.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

8. As these cases illustrate, at an evidentiary hearing in which the district court determines
whether a petitioner communicated his intent to appeal to his counsel, and whether
counsel thereafter failed to pursue an appeal, "[i]t [is] necessary for the ... court to make
a finding whether [petitioner's] desire to appeal was adequately communicated to his
attorney and that the attorney's failure to file a direct appeal resulted from deficient
performance." Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 894, 898, 865 P.2d 985, 989 (Ct. App. 1993)
(citation omitted). Thereafter, if the court concludes that ineffective assistance deprived
the petitioner of his opportunity to appeal, the petitioner will be entitled to relief. Id.
9. Here, Petitioner made a single request to "appeal everything". This request was made
during a time of confusion and stress, directly after Petitioner heard the verdict. In fact,
this statement was made even prior to Petitioner's ability to appeal, as no sentence or
judgment had yet been rendered. Petitioner's attorneys asked Petitioner to set up an
appointment, at which point they could discuss a potential appeal. However, Petitioner
thereafter did not contact his attorneys, did not respond to attempted correspondence
from his attorneys, and never again evidenced a desire to appeal.
10. Petitioner's attorneys acted reasonably when attempting to set up an appointment with
Petitioner, as Petitioner initially made a request to appeal during a confusing and stressful
time.
11. Unlike the authority set forth above, Petitioner's desire to appeal was not simply ignored;
Petitioner ignored his counsel.
12. Unlike the authority set forth above, it was not the attorneys' inaction which caused
Petitioner not to appeal, but the Petitioner's own inaction which resulted in a failure to
appeal. Thus, Petitioner's request was not fully and fairly communicated to counsel, such
as to warrant a conclusion that it was the attorneys' ineffective assistance which deprived
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

the Petitioner of his opportunity to appeal.
13. Counsel reasonably believed that Petitioner had abandoned any desire to file an appeal, as
Petitioner ignored counsels' repeated attempts to communicate with Petitioner regarding
an appeal.
14. Petitioner's trial counsel never told Petitioner that he could be retried on the cocaine
charge for which he was acquitted, if he filed an appeal.

Dated this ~ day of May, 2011.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of May, 2011, I caused, to be served, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document as addressed to:
Art Verharen
Fax: (208) 446-1833
Sean Walsh
Walsh Law Office, PLLC
206 Indiana St., Ste, 117
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Fax: (208) 765-4636
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

KIRK GOSCH,

CASE NO. CV-2007-5443

Petitioner,

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

The Court having before it the above Respondent's motion, and good cause appearing,
now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Post-Conviction Relief Petition sought on behalf of
the Petitioner is and shall be hereby dismissed with prejudice.

Dated this

-k

day of May, 2011.

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL

1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ~ day of May, 2011, I caused, to be served, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document as addressed to:
Art Verharen
Fax: (208) 446-1833
Sean Walsh
Walsh Law Office, PLLC
206 Indiana St., Ste, 117
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Fax: (208) 765-4636

~

Deputy Clerk

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
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SEAN P . WALSH
CONFLICT PUBLIC DEFENDER
Walsh Law Office, PLLC.
206 E. Indiana Avenue, Suite 117
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Phone: (208) 665-7400
Fax: (208) 765-4636
ISBN: 7235
Attorney for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
K1RKJ. GOSCH,
Plaintiff/
Appellant,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Defendant/
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NUMBER

CV07-5443

NOTICE OF APPEAL

----------------------------)
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT:
1.

The above named Appellant hereby appeals against the above named Respondent,

the State ofldaho, to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Order Denying Motion To Reconsider
Sentence entered in the above entitled matter on May 3,2011, the Honorable Simpson, presiding.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Page 1
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2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment

described above in paragraph one, is an appealable Judgment under and pursuant to Idaho
Appellate Rule II(a).

3.

The issues Appellant intends to assert in this appeal include, but are not

necessarily limited to:
Whether the Court abused its discretion in denying the Appellant's Amended
Petition For Post Conviction Relief.
4.

Appellant requests the preparation of the transcript of the hearing on trial held on

May 3,2011.
5.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's

record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 LA.R.: None
6.

I hereby certifY as follows:

A.

A copy ofthis Notice of Appeal has been served upon all court reporters from

whom a transcript is requested. The name and address of each such reporter is marked below in
the Certificate of Service.
B.

The Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because the

Appellant is an indigent who is represented by a Conflict Public Defender pursuant to Court
Appointment.
C.

The Appellant is exempt from paying the filing fee because the Appellant is an

indigent who is represented by a Conflict Public Defender pursuant to Court Appointment.
D.

The Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the preparation of the

record because the Appellant is an indigent who is represented by a Conflict Public Defender
pursuant to Court Appointment.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Page 2

E.

Service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20

I.A.R., to wit the Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney, and the Attorney General ofIdaho
pursuant to Section 67-1401 (1) Idaho Code.

DATED this

_6=--_ day of May, 2011.
BY:
P. WALSH
SE
CONFLICT PUBLIC DEFENDER

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

li?

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this
day of May, 2011, served a true and
correct copy ofthe attached NOTICE OF APPEAL via interoffice mail or as otherwise indicated
upon the parties as follows:

x

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000

x

Molly 1. Huskey
State Appellate Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703

x

Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
P.O.Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

U

LJ

o;Ll
U
U

~

via Interoffice Mail

First Class Mail
Certified Mail
Facsimile (208) 334-2985

First Class Mail
Certified Mail
Facsimile (208) 854-8074

Reporter for District Judge John T. Mitchell, Julie Foland (Kootenai County, PO Box
9000, Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816)
Reporter for District Judge Fred M. Gibler, ByrJ R. Cinnamon (Kootenai County, PO Box
9000, Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816)
Reporter for District Judge John P. Luster, Anne MacMannus (Kootenai County, PO Box
9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816)
Reporter for District Judge Benjamin Simpson, JoAnn Schaller (Kootenai County, PO
Box 9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816)
Reporter for District Judge Lansing Haynes, Laurie Johnson (Kootenai County, PO Box
9000, Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816)

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Page 4
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STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF KOOTENA
FI LED: ---:-_~.L-":.-"-'.,..-

AT
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CLE

SEAN P. WALSH
CONFLICT PUBLIC DEFENDER
206 E. Indiana Avenue, Suite 117
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Phone: (208) 665-7400
Fax: (208) 765-4636
ISBN: 7235

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
KIRKJ. GOSCH,
Plaintiff,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)"
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NUMBER

CV07-5443

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER IN
DIRECT APPEAL; RETAINING TRIAL
COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES

Defendant.

TO: OFFICE OF THE IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, AND, SEAN
P. WALSH, WALSH LAW OFFICE, PLLC., KOOTENAI COUNTY.
A judgment having been entered by this Court on May 3,2011, and the defendant having
requested the aid of counsel in pursuing a direct appeal from this district court in this felony matter,
and defendant's trial counsel having filed a timely notice of appeal, and the Court being satisfied
that said defendant continues to be a needy person entitled to public representation, therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with I.C. 19-870, that the State Appellate Public
Defender is appointed to represent defendant in all further proceedings involving his appeal.

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER IN
DIRECT APPEAL; RETAINING TRIAL COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES -1-

..,

Ij

Ii 0

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that trial counsel shall remain as appointed counsel of record
for all other matters involving action in the trial court which, if resulting in an order in defendant's
favor, could affect the judgment, order or sentencing in the action, until the expiration of the time
limit for filing said motions or, if sought and denied, upon the expiration of the time for appeal of
such ruling with the responsibility to decide whether or not a further appeal will be taken in such
matters.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that trial counsel shall cooperate with the Office of State
Appellate Public Defender in the prosecution of defendant's appeal.
DATED this

---112- day of May, 2011.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER IN
DIRECT APPEAL; RETAINING TRIAL COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES

-2-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this
J611l- day of, served a of May, 2011 true and
correct copy of the attached ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER via facsimile, interoffice mail or as otherwise indicated upon the parties as follows:

x
x

Sean P. Walsh, Conflict Public Defender
206 E. Indiana Ave., Suite 117
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

[]
[ ]

First Class Mail

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

[ ]

[]

Interoffice Mail
Facsimile (208) 446-1833

Facsimile (208) 6~~~0«" 3~

x

State Appellate Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

First Class Mail
Certified Mail
Facsimile (208) 334-2985

x

Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

[ ]
[ ]
[ ]

First Class Mail
Certified Mail
Facsimile (208) 334 2530

Supreme Court (certified)

[ ]

First Class Mail
Fax Certified (208) 334-2616

1><1

9s;t{-~ll

Reporter for District Judge John T. Mitchell, Julie Foland via Interoffice Mail
Reporter for District Judge Fred M. Gibler, Byrl R. Cinnamon via Interoffice Mail
Reporter for District Judge John P. Luster, Anne MacMannus via Interoffice Mail

~In R-Su'J{t/S'O'1

Reporter for District J u d g e ' . H03tlelt, JoAnn Schaller via Interoffice Mail
Reporter for District Judge Lansing Haynes, Laurie Johnson via Interoffice Mail

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER IN
DIRECT APPEAL; RETAINING TRIAL COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES
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PLAINTIFF's EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT #1

Memorandum Opinion

EXHIBIT #2

Order Denying Defendant's Motion

EXHIBIT #3

Filed 1/30/06

for Interlocutory Appeal

Filed 2/27/06

Judgment and Sentencing Disposition

Filed 9/20/06

IN THE SUPPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
KIRKJGOSCH

)

)
Plaintiff!Appellant,

vs
STATE OF IDAHO
Defendant/Respondents,

)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO.
38791-2011

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
I, Daniell. English, Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing
record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is
a true, full and correct record of the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho
Appellate Rules.
I further certify that exhibits were offered and sent to Supreme Court.
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the
Clerk's Record was complete and ready to be picked up, or ifthe attorney is out of town,
the copies were mailed by U.S. mail, postage prepaid on the
-=~--,-=--=-__

7

J

Y day of

2011:

I do further certify that the Clerk's Record will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the
Supreme Court.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at
Kootenai County, Idaho this

Il~,

day -,,=~"'--'-"~=-7 2011.
Clifford T Hayes
Clerk of the District Court
By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

KIRK J GOSCH
Plaintiff/Appellant,

w

)
)
)
)

)

STA TE OF IDAHO

Defendant/Respondents,

)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO.
38791-2011

-------------------------)

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of the District Court ofthe First Judicial District of the
State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certifY that I have personally
served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the
Attorneys of record in this cause as follows:

Molly Huskey
State Appellate Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise ID 83703

Lawrence G Wasden
Attorney General
PO Box 83720
Boise ID 83720-0010

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have unto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court
this
day o~ & 'b ~.20 11.
Clifford T Hayes
Clerk of the District Court
by: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

